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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1992, former Senator Albert Gore and Representa-
tive John Lewis introduced legislation into the U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives entitled the "Environmental Justice
Act of 1992."1 This legislation was the outgrowth of a long list
of protests, studies, and cases involving a phenomenon known
as "environmental racism."2 The proposed legislation was
designed to "help those people who face the greatest risk of
exposure to toxic substances and pollution."3 In addressing the
Senate, Senator Gore noted that the United States
faces disturbing inequities in the way severe pollutant
problems are distributed .... In disproportionate amounts,
toxic wastes and toxic emissions from industrial processes
* B.A. 1989, Pomona College; J.D. Candidate 1994, University of Puget Sound
School of Law.
1. The Senate proposal, sponsored by former Senator Albert Gore (D-Tn.), was
referred to the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on June 3, 1992. See
S. 2806, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The House proposal was sponsored by
Representative John Lewis (D-Ga.) and other House Democrats. See H.R. 5326, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see also Sharyn Wizda, Lewis Unveils Environmental Bill,
STATES NEWS SERVICE, June 3, 1992.
2. Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., former director of the United Church of Christ
Commission for Racial Justice, pioneered the concept of environmental racism in a
seminal report coauthored by Charles Lee. See REV. BENJAMIN F. CHAVIS, JR. &
CHARLES LEE, COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND
SocIo-EcoNOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES
(1987). The concept is premised on the belief that minority communities are
disproportionately burdened by polluting industries and other sites hazardous to the
environment and human health. Id. at xv.
3. 138 CONG. REC. S7489 (1992) (statement of Sen. Gore); see also Capitol Hill
Hearing, News Conference with Senator Albert Gore and Representative John Lewis and
Others, FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 3, 1992 (hereinafter Capitol Hill Hearing]. At this
hearing, Barbara Anwar, the Executive Director of the Lawyer's Committee for Civil
Rights Under the Law, stated that "the fundamental objectives of the Environmental
Justice Act... is [sic] to provide equal protection under the law, to ensure protection for
communities that have been adversely impacted already, and to ameliorate and
substantially change those conditions." Id.
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contaminate the neighborhoods of minority communities,
depressing land values and posing serious threats to the
health of those in our society least empowered financially and
politically to do anything about it.4
Although the 1992 Act eventually died in committee, sev-
eral members of the House and Senate recently reintroduced
two versions of the Environmental Justice Act of 1993.1 Inter-
est in the phenomenon of environmental racism has steadily
increased and, with the advent of the new, more environmen-
tally concerned Clinton/Gore Administration in January 1993,
it is possible that Congress will pass a version of the Environ-
mental Justice Act in the next year or two. 6 Unfortunately, in
4. 138 CONG. REC. S7480, 87489 (daily ed. June 3, 1992) (statement of Sen. Gore).
5. On Wednesday, May 12, 1993, Representative Lewis (D-Ga.) once again
introduced the Act in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993). The Act was referred to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, Public
Works and Transportation, Education and Labor, and Agriculture. The House version
of the Act is nearly identical to the original 1992 version, with only slight modifications
in phrasing and provisions.
The Senate version of the Act, however, which was introduced on Thursday, June
24, 1993, by Senators Baucus (D-Mt.), Moseley-Brown (D-Ill.), and Campbell (D-Colo.),
substantially reorganized and modified the 1992 version. See S. 1161, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993). A detailed analysis of the Environmental Justice Act of 1993 is provided in
Part IV of this Comment.
6. The Clinton/Gore Administration has already demonstrated its sensitivity to
and interest in the issue of racial equity in environmental matters. In December 1992,
President-elect Clinton appointed Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., to his transition team
to assist in an analysis of the federal bureaus concerned with natural resources. See
UCC Racial Justice Officer Joins Clinton-Gore Team, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 19, 1992,
at Dll. Chavis was later selected to serve as the Executive Director of the NAACP,
where he plans to "maintain environmental justice as a key priority." See Chavis To
Take Fight for Environmental Justice to NAACP, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Apr. 10,
1993, at 6A.
Even more recently, President Clinton signed Executive Order No. 12,898, Exec.
Order No. 12,898, Fed. Reg. 7,629 (1994), which is designed to ensure that the programs
of all federal agencies "do not unfairly inflict environmental harm on the poor and
members of minorities." John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton To Order Action To Undo Bias
in Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1994, at Al. The Order, signed February 11, 1994,
mandates the collection and analysis of census and pollution data by all agencies and
establishes a deadline of one year for each agency to complete a strategy detailing its
objectives and enforcement mechanisms to
(1) promote enforcement of all health and environmental statutes in areas
with minority populations and low-income populations; (2) ensure greater
public participation; (3) improve research and data collection relating to the
health of and environment of minority populations and low-income
populations; and (4) identify differential patterns of consumption of natural
resources among minority populations and low-income populations.
Exec. Order No. 12,898, Fed. Reg. 7,629 (1994). Although this Order represents a major
acknowledgment by the executive branch that it is ready to take action, the Order
appears largely symbolic in nature. The Order seems to be mainly a data-gathering
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its present form, the proposed legislation will not provide an
effective solution to the problem of unequal environmental bur-
dens in the United States.
This Comment addresses the concept of environmental
racism, the tools that have been used to fight it, and the pro-
posed Environmental Justice Act of 1993. Part II begins with
an examination of the evidence minority communities have
relied on as proof that environmental racism exists. The evi-
dence contained in numerous articles clearly shows inequalities
in the amounts of environmental and health hazards minority
communities bear, and this evidence validates the existence of
pervasive environmental injustice in our society. Part III
addresses the limited case law involving attempts by minority
communities to challenge perceived environmental racism and
assesses the effectiveness of the existing legal tools used in such
cases.
Part IV of this Comment examines the text of the proposed
Environmental Justice Act of 1993. This Part analyzes the
Act's potential as a solution to the problem of unequal environ-
mental burdens and identifies the Act's weaknesses in method-
ology and overall tone. Part V suggests the need for a more
effective legislative response to the problem, both by suggesting
revisions in the provisions and goals of the Act and by sug-
gesting areas for further consideration. Finally, Part VI con-
cludes that the Act, though a step forward in recognizing the
unequal environmental and health burdens nationwide, will not
be effective in its present form. It will simply not provide
minority communities with effective assistance in their fight
against unequal environmental burdens.
II. THE PHENOMENON OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
Section A of this Part begins by defining environmental
racism and providing a background of the problem as perceived
by racial minority communities and governmental agencies.
Section B sets out the various studies and reports that have
attempted to explore allegations of inequity in connection with
device, and more importantly, the effectiveness of the Order is weakened "by the fact
that agencies will be required to assume the financial costs of compliance [and the fact
that] it does not carry the force of law." The EPA's Dirty Secret, BosTON GLOBE, Feb. 13,
1994, at 74. Accordingly, this Comment continues to maintain that a legislative
response is needed, one that will provide minorities with the legal foundation on which
to build a case in court.
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pollution and environmentally hazardous facilities and
industries.
A. Defining the Concern
Our society appears to discriminate by race in environmen-
tal policymaking, in the siting of landfills and other noxious
facilities, and in the enforcement of environmental laws and
regulations.7 Minority citizens are more likely to live near
unsightly sewage treatment plants, incinerators, and landfills
than are white citizens.8 Furthermore, the inequitable siting
patterns and policymaking causing this imbalance are also ele-
vating health risks in the overly burdened minority communi-
ties.9 The Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., coauthor of one of the
initial studies linking race to environmental hazards and of the
1992 version of the Environmental Justice Act, defined the
problem as environmental racism.' 0
The information contained in the above study, as well as in
other reports, has spawned massive grassroots movements in
the racial minority and low socioeconomic communities of our
country." While minority communities have historically repre-
sented "the path of least resistance" 2 in connection with the
siting and operation of landfills, petrochemical plants, incinera-
tors, smelters, and hazardous waste storage facilities, minority
citizens are now banding together to block that path. In fact,
Dr. Robert Bullard, a Professor of Sociology at the University of
California, Riverside, has identified more than two hundred
minority grassroots organizations that are actively involved in
neighborhood environmental issues.1 3 In each case, the citizens
are united by perceived unequal treatment and insidious dis-
crimination; their mandate is one of equity and justice regard-
7. See infra part II.B.
8. See Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Racism, 7 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T 23, 24 (1993).
9. Id.
10. Brad Knickerbocker, The Environmentally Disenfranchised, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 14, 1992, at 11; see also CHAVis & LEE, supra note 2, at ix (expressing the
hope that the study will "be used by all persons committed to racial and environmental
justice to challenge what [is believed] to be an insidious form of racism").
11. CHAvis & LEE, supra note 2, at xii.
12. David Holmstrom, Pollution in US Cities Hits Minorities Hardest, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 7, 1993, at 8; see also ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE,
CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 4 (1990).
13. See Holmstrom, supra note 12, at 8.
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ing the environmental hazards they face. The data and
statistics clearly support their claim that a problem exists.
B. The Studies
Since the 1970s, several governmental institutions, non-
profit organizations, and individuals have studied the existence
of disproportionate environmental burdens on the poor and
minorities.14 Although their findings illustrate that the sources
and causes of unequal environmental burdens are complex and
uncertain, they also demonstrate that the inequalities are per-
vasive enough to be a real concern. 15 In Sections 1 through 4,
this Comment sets forth the major findings of four of these
studies.
1. The U.S. General Accounting Office Report
An early region-oriented study of the connection between
race and environmental hazards grew out of opposition to the
siting of a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) landfill in Warren
County, North Carolina in the early 1980s. 16 The predomi-
nantly African American citizens of Warren County had staged
a nonviolent protest, and, though the campaign was ultimately
unsuccessful, it drew national attention to the controversial
practice of establishing hazardous waste storage facilities in
poor and racial minority communities.' 7 The U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) responded with a report that
examined the racial and socioeconomic composition of communi-
ties surrounding four landfills in three southeastern states of
14. See Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race
and Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. CoLo. L. REV.
921, 926 (1992) (indicating 16 studies that document inequitable environmental
burdens along racial lines).
15. See CHAvis & LEE, supra note 2; Bullard, supra note 8; Marianne Lavelle &
Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 21, 1992 (special investigation section).
16. See CHAvis & LEE, supra note 2, at xi; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANFILIS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND
ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 2 (1983). An earlier study, conducted
by Robert Bullard of the University of California, Riverside, in 1979, found that five out
of five municipal-owned landfills in Houston, Texas were located in African American
neighborhoods. BULLARD, supra note 12, at 8. Despite these statistics, a federal judge
presiding over a related lawsuit ruled that there was not a substantial likelihood of
proving that the decision to grant the permit was motivated by purposeful racial
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Bean v. Southwestern Waste
Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
17. Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV.
394, 394 (1991).
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the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Region IV.'
Using 1980 census data, the report concluded that African
Americans composed the majority of the population in three out
of four communities where landfills were located. 9 The report
also noted that, in these communities, the majority of those
whose incomes were below the poverty level were African
American.2 °
Perhaps the most striking example from the GAO study
involved the Chemical Waste Management hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facility in Sumter County, Ala-
bama.21 The landfill was located in a community that, in 1980,
had a ninety percent African American population.22 This
minority population also represented one hundred percent of
the community that was below the poverty level.23 Of the other
communities that were located within four miles of the hazard-
ous waste facility, one community was eighty-four percent Afri-
can American, and the other was sixty-nine percent African
American.2 4
The GAO study established similarly suspicious statistics,
in terms of proportionate impact on minority residents, for
North Carolina's Warren County landfill.25 The report noted
that the state had initially found two sites to be satisfactory for
landfill purposes: the first in Chatham County and the second
in Warren County.2 6 The Chatham site was publicly owned; the
county would not sell it, and North Carolina did not have the
power of eminent domain. 27 Thus, Warren County was chosen
by default. The report did not examine the racial and socioeco-
nomic composition of the Chatham site. However, the report
did note that the population of Shocco Township, the precise
location within Warren County chosen for the landfill, was
sixty-six percent African American as of 1980.28
18. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 16, at 2.
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id.
21. Id. at app. I, 1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 7.
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The GAO study also noted that several attempts were made
to stop the landfill in Warren County.29 Two lawsuits were filed
to prevent the initial construction, both of which were settled in
favor of the state. Furthermore, the local chapter of the
NAACP, alleging racial discrimination, sought a preliminary
injunction to prohibit the placement of PCBs in the county. 0
Despite the clear racial imbalance of the site, the court denied
the injunction.31 The court stated simply that there were no
allegations in any of the previous hearings or suits concerning
the landfill that the site choices had been motivated by race.32
2. The United Church of Christ Commission for Racial
Justice Study
The narrowly focused and regional nature of the GAO study
endowed it with limited usefulness. Seeking a more analytical,
nationwide inquiry into the issue of disproportionate burdens
on minority communities, the United Church of Christ's Com-
mission for Racial Justice conducted a study in 1987 to deter-
mine the correlation between the location of hazardous waste
sites and the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of the sur-
rounding communities.33
The study concluded that three out of every five African
Americans and Hispanic Americans live in communities with"uncontrolled toxic waste sites,"34 or closed and abandoned sites
on the EPA's list of sites posing a present or potential threat to
human health and the environment.3" The Commission discov-
ered that the mean minority percentage of the population in
communities with a single operating hazardous waste facility-
twenty-four percent-was twice that of communities without
such waste sites. 6 When the number of the facilities was
increased to two or more, the mean minority percentage jumped
to thirty-eight percent, or more than three times that of commu-
nities with no waste sites.3
29. Id. at 10.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. CHAVIs & LEE, supra note 2, at xii.
34. Id. at 13.
35. Id. at xii.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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The study illustrated what minority communities had
feared all along: that the percentage of community residents
that belong to a particular racial or ethnic group is a strong pre-
dictor of the level of commercial hazardous waste activity-even
stronger than household income or other factors.A Indeed, the
Commission concluded that race, not socioeconomic status, was
the most significant factor relating to the presence of hazardous
wastes in communities in this country, noting that the
probability that such a siting pattern could occur by chance was
less than one in 10,000. 3
3. The Environmental Protection Agency Report
Concern over environmental inequity in minority communi-
ties has continued to grow in this decade. In 1990, Paul Mohai
and Bunyan Bryant, professors at the University of Michigan
School of Natural Resources, organized a conference to examine
further the claim that racial minorities suffer disproportionate
exposure to and health risks from pollution.40 A coalition of
civil rights leaders and social scientists from this conference,
informally known as the "Michigan Coalition," pressured the
EPA to address the problem at the federal level.4 ' EPA Admin-
istrator William Reilly responded by forming the EPA Environ-
mental Equity Workgroup to assess the evidence that racial
minority and low socioeconomic communities bear a dispropor-
tionate environmental risk burden and to consider possible EPA
responses to identified disparities.42
The result of the Workgroup's efforts was a two-volume
report, released by the EPA in June 1992, on the subject of
"environmental equity."43 In Volume I, the primary document
of the report, the Workgroup examined the issue of environmen-
tal inequity and the data presented in previous studies and
reports, and made recommendations to the EPA, including a
recommendation to give more explicit attention to environmen-
tal equity issues. 44 Volume II was a supporting document, con-
38. Id. at 13.
39. Id. at 15.
40. See Emilia Askari, EPA Finds That Minorities Encounter More Pollutants, DET.
FREE PRESS, July 24, 1992, at 1A.
41. 1 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING THE
RISKS FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 6 (1992).
42. Id. at 2.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 25.
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sisting of the comments and criticisms submitted by technical
and policy experts in response to the Workgroup's conclusions.45
While the report was hailed by some as the first step
toward remedying the existence of serious environmental dis-
parities, many readers criticized it as a "useless piece of mate-
rial."46 A key criticism from minority citizen organizations was
the EPA's unwillingness to validate their claims of environmen-
tal racism. 47 The EPA's position on the issue was summed up
by Robert Wolcott, an EPA official involved in the Workgroup.
He stated that the central factor with regard to proximity to
pollution is not systematic environmental racism, but rather"economic class... [and whether one has the] resources to locate
oneself in jobs and homes that avoid exposure."48 The report
stated that the causes of disparate environmental risks "are
complex and deeply rooted in historical patterns of commerce,
geography, state and local land use decisions, and other fac-
tors."49 Although the report acknowledged that "[r]acial minor-
ity and low-income populations experience disproportionate
exposures to selected air pollutants, hazardous waste facilities,
contaminated fish and agricultural pesticides in the work-
place,"50 the Workgroup was unwilling to acknowledge a clear
connection between race and environmental hazards. The
report only stated that race and income appeared to be corre-
lated with the distribution of some types of pollutants, as with
agricultural chemicals and the high level of minority
farmworkers.5 ' Overall, the report's main finding was that
additional data on environmental health effects by race and
income was needed.52
4. The National Law Journal Investigation
The most recent development in the study of unequal envi-
ronmental burdens was an investigation conducted by the
45. See 2 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 41.
46. Study Revealing EPA Discrimination in Enforcement a Surprise, Official Says,
Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) (Sept. 17, 1992), available in WESTLAW, BNA File.
47. See, e.g., 2 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, supra note 41, at 81 (claiming that
the EPA was "casting doubt on the existence" of the problem of environmental equity).
48. Michael Weisskopf, Minorities' Pollution Risk Is Debated; Some Activists Link
Exposure to Racism, WASH. PosT, Jan. 16, 1992, at A25.
49. 1 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 41, at 2.
50. Id. at 12.
51. Id. at 12, 17.
52. Id. at 11, 15-16. Lead poisoning was deemed an exception, however, as data
unambiguously shows that more black children have high blood lead levels. Id. at 11.
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National Law Journal (NLJ) and released in September 1992.53
In addition to examining the evidence presented by earlier stud-
ies, the NLJ scrutinized two additional aspects of environmen-
tal inequities: cleanup and fines. Unlike the EPA's
Environmental Equity Workgroup, the NLJ study acknowl-
edged a clear connection between race and environmental
hazards. The results of the investigation demonstrated that
"the federal government, in its cleanup of hazardous waste sites
and its pursuit of polluters, favors white communities over
minority communities under environmental laws meant to pro-
vide equal protection for all citizens."54 Using computer-
assisted analysis of census data, the civil court case docket of
the EPA, and the EPA's own record of performance in connec-
tion with 1,177 Superfund55 sites, the NLJ found that the pen-
alties assessed against polluters under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)56 at sites in predomi-
nantly white communities averaged $335,566.00." 7 This figure
53. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 15, at S1.
54. Id. at S2. In a letter responding to the National Law Journal investigation,
William K. Reilly, former EPA Administrator, criticized the NLJ's analysis as being
"flawed and too narrow in its scope to yield an accurate assessment of [the EPA's]
programs." William K. Reilly, The EPA Responds to NLJ Report, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 25,
1993, at 16-18. He claimed that the NLJ's analysis was limited to a small,
unrepresentative sample of the agency's enforcement actions (i.e., civil judicial suits for
penalties) and that many other enforcement actions are brought as administrative
actions and criminal proceedings. Id. He concluded by stating that the EPA is
committed to promoting awareness and sensitivity to environmental equity concerns
and that, if the EPA's analyses show inequitable treatment of minority or low-income
citizens, "the agency will take decisive corrective action." Id.
55. "Superfund" sites are those being cleaned up pursuant to the requirements of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). One of the main purposes of CERCLA is to
provide funding and enforcement authority for cleaning up hazardous waste sites
created in the past. Robert T. Lee, Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 267, 267 (12th ed.
1993). Under EPA regulations, a site must be placed on the National Priorities List
(NPL) before it is eligible for remedial action. Id. at 276. The EPA takes action on sites
that withstand a lengthy weeding out procedure. The EPA first conducts a preliminary
assessment of the site. Id. Assuming the need is recognized, the EPA then conducts a
physical site inspection. Id. at 276-77. Again, assuming the need is recognized, the
EPA resorts to a "hazard ranking system," by which it uses certain factors, such as the
toxicity and volume of the site's wastes and the proximity of the site to things such as
drinking water and populations, to determine whether the site should be placed on the
NPL for cleanup. Id. at 277. Once the site is placed on the NPL, the EPA tackles these
sites pursuant to a Superfund Comprehensive Accomplishments Plan (SCAP), which
shows the allocation of the EPA's resources for each fiscal year. Id.
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
57. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, lead story (untitled), NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21,
1992, at S4 (special investigation section).
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contrasts sharply with the $55,318.00 figure for RCRA violators
in minority communities.55 In addition, the investigation found
that the EPA chooses containment, or the walling off or capping
of waste at hazardous dump sites in minority communities,
seven percent more frequently than in white communities.5 9
Conversely, white communities receive the preferred method of
cleanup, or permanent treatment, twenty-two percent more
often than containment.60 Overall, the NLJ found that penal-
ties assessed under all the federal environmental laws aimed at
air, water, and waste pollution were forty-six percent higher in
white communities than in minority communities. 61 An impor-
tant aspect of the NLJ findings is that the investigation con-
cluded that "racial imbalance . . . often occurs whether the
community is wealthy or poor. "1 2
The NLJ investigation also provided several community
profiles that illustrate the disparate environmental impact on
minorities. Three profiles are particularly helpful in defining
the inequity problem. In Moss Point, Mississippi, a garbage
incinerator exudes a rank-smelling steam that pervades this
mostly African American community.63 The incinerator is actu-
ally owned by the city of Pascagoula, a mostly white community
that sits across the Escatawpa River from Moss Point.64 In
December 1991, the Pascagoula City Council decided to import
and burn medical waste at the incinerator.6 5 Significantly,
Moss Point is already saddled with chemical plants, the odors
and pollution from the International Paper mill, and the largest
low-level radioactive site in Mississippi. 6
A second example is the minority community of Chicago's
Far South Side. There, residents are organizing in response to
the waste sites and pollution left by the area's industrial past.6 7
The residents of the area suffer from a particularly large
58. Id. at S2.
59. Id. at S6.
60. Id. at S2.
61. Id.
62. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 15, at S2.
63. Marcia Coyle, Town Fights Waste Plan, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S9
(special investigation section).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Already, African American residents of Moss Point have galvanized to fight
the medical waste decision. Id.
67. Marianne Lavelle, An Industrial Legacy, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S3
(special investigation section).
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number of diseases, including rashes, respiratory ailments, can-
cer, and infant birth defects.6" The steel industry, which once
operated in the area, left behind fifty abandoned toxic waste
dumps full of highly potent chemical mixtures. 9 In addition,
the area hosts landfills, industrial incinerators, and the city
sewage plant.70
A final example of inequitable pollution burdens on minori-
ties is an area of Louisiana known to environmentalists and
health officials as "Cancer Alley."71 The area derives its name
from the approximately 130 oil and chemical plants that occupy
more than 100 miles along the Mississippi River between New
Orleans and Baton Rouge. 72 These industries dump an esti-
mated 900 million pounds or more of toxins into the land, water,
and air per year.v3
Recently, some residents of this area were narrowly suc-
cessful in averting the placement of an additional environmen-
tal burden in their neighborhood.7 a  The environmentally
controversial Formosa Plastics Corporation had made plans to
build a $700 million rayon pulp processing plant, with the
option of ultimately expanding to a polyvinyl chloride plant, in
the predominantly African American town of Wallace, Louisi-
ana.7 5 The environmental and health risks presented by the
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The grassroots organization, People for Community Recovery, reacted to
the pollution and lack of cleanup efforts by staging protests and getting signatures on
petitions. Id. To date, they have successfully forced city and state officials to provide
municipal water hookups for families that were using sulfur contaminated wells, to
shut down Chemical Waste's highly noxious incinerator, and to conduct a formal health
survey of the area designed to identify the need for future studies. Id. The biggest
hurdle for the minority organization so far has been that no single site or industry is
responsible for the area's pollution, and none of the fifty toxic sites was ever considered
bad enough to be placed on the Superfund list. Residents hope the health assessment
will demonstrate that the only real solution is a massive cleanup effort. Id. While
common sense would seem to indicate that the cumulative effect of the dumps and
industries should be afforded more weight and the entire area declared a Superfund
site, residents are apparently resigned to the fact that real assistance comes more
slowly to African American communities.
71. Marcia Coyle, Saying 'No' to Cancer Alley, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S5
(special investigation section).
72. Id.
73. Paul McEnroe, Cancer Alley Blacks Charge Environmental Racism by Giant
Chemical Firms, STAR TRIa., July 21, 1991, at 1A.
74. See Christina Cheakalos, LA Town Defeats Industrial Giant-Rejects Factory
Along 'Cancer Alley,' ATLANTA J., Oct. 20, 1992, at E4.
75. Coyle, supra note 71, at S5. The article noted that the town of Wallace was 98%
African American. Id.
[Vol. 17:417
1994] Proposed Environmental Justice Act 429
plant were fairly serious because the manufacture of polyvinyl
chloride produces extremely toxic and sometimes explosive by-
products, such as ethylene dichloride and chloroform.76 Many
residents of Wallace and the surrounding parish77 communities
opposed the new plant. However, other residents were enticed
by Formosa's promise of money and one thousand jobs, particu-
larly because "black communities that don't have industries are
very poor communities.""8 Despite Formosa's reputation as a"consistent environmental offender,"7 9 the Wallace Parish
Council acceded to the company's request to rezone 1,800 acres
of land from residential property to industrial property. 0 The
decision allowed Formosa to buy up land in the area for its
plant at a cost of about ten million dollars.8 '
Viewed in light of the concept of environmental racism, the
Wallace rezoning decision of April 1990 is particularly sus-
pect. 2 "Whether intentional or not, the . .. [Wallace] Parish
Council exercised its political power to isolate, separate, and
exploit the African American community of Wallace."" Resi-
dential property usually receives protection from zoning com-
missions; in this case, however, the Council decided not to force
76. See Kelly M. Colquette & Elizabeth A. H. Robertson, Environmental Racism:
The Causes, Consequences, and Commendations, 5 TuLANE ENVTL. L.J. 153, 179 (1991).
Colquette and Robertson note in their article that ethylene dichloride (EDC) and
chloroform can cause cancer, as well as damage to and mutations in embryos. Id. at 179
n.158. The vapor of EDC is highly flammable and can cause disastrous, toxic
explosions. Id. Chloroform is also particularly invidious, as it becomes increasingly
concentrated in living organisms as one moves up the food chain. Id. at 179 n.160.
77. A "parish" is an administrative subdivision in Louisiana that corresponds to a
county in other states. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 903 (2d. College ed. 1982).
78. Coyle, supra note 71, at S5.
79. Colquette & Robertson, supra note 76, at 177.
80. Id. at 176.
81. Bob Warren, Giant Rayon Plant in St. John Is Canceled-Permit Troubles,
Lawsuits Blamed, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Oct. 8, 1992, at Al.
82. Colquette & Robertson, supra note 76, at 176.
83. Id. at 180. Both Formosa and the Council were probably surprised by the force
of the societal opposition. Hoping to empower the minority residents of Wallace who
were opposed to the plant, environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund and Greenpeace mobilized the grassroots opposition by alerting residents
to the siting processes and to the health risks and environmental damage the Formosa
plant would mean for Wallace and other communities. Bob Warren & Drew Broach,
Little Guy Won Formosa Battle, Foes Say, NEw ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Oct. 9, 1992,
at Al. After three years of bitter warfare, Formosa Plastics decided to cancel its plans
in Wallace. Cheakalos, supra note 74. Although Formosa blamed its change of mind on
the slow and demanding federal permit process and a second lawsuit filed by a
neighboring owner of an historic antebellum home, residents and environmentalists
claim that the company did not have the determination to continue to fight the
overwhelming charges of environmental racism. Warren & Broach, supra, at Al.
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Formosa to locate in other, industrial-zoned areas on the banks
of the Mississippi River. Because the Council abandoned the
area's residential zoning, residents of Wallace were placed at
risk for greater health effects and the destruction of their envi-
ronmental quality. 4 In Louisiana, it appears that Itihe state
offers, and industry accepts . .. cheap black lives." 5 Further-
more, while industries claim that they simply look for cheap
land and cheap water, Professor Robert Kuehn of the Tulane
Environmental Law Clinic claims that they also consider "the
political and economic strength of the neighborhood to oppose or
interfere with the company's plans."8 6
As the foregoing discussion of the four studies indicates,
two decades of statistical evidence supports the allegation that
there is a pervasive inequity in this country with regard to the
location and cleanup of environmental and health hazards.
Minority communities shoulder a disproportionate number of
these burdens, a phenomenon that has become known as envi-
ronmental racism. Whether intentional racism is the cause of
the unequal burden is not always certain; unintentional reasons
for the resulting discriminatory impact, such as economic or
political considerations, are likely to play a role. Still, the sta-
tistics show a recurrent injustice along predominantly racial
lines, despite basic notions of justice dictating that these overly
burdened minority communities should not be the nation's
"dumping ground." Minority communities have not been suc-
cessful, however, in achieving such justice. Part III of this Com-
ment describes the current difficulties minority communities
face when they attempt legal challenges to their disproportion-
ate burden of environmental and health hazards.
III. FAILURE OF THE EXISTING LEGAL TOOLS AND DOCTRINES
Concerned by the disproportionate number of landfills,
smelters, incinerators, hazardous waste storage facilities, and
other sources of pollution located in their neighborhoods, minor-
ity communities have galvanized to seek relief from the courts.
Whether they have used constitutional or statutory claims
based on discriminatory intent8 7 or claims involving more gen-
84. Colquette & Robertson, supra note 76, at 176.
85. Coyle, supra note 71, at S5.
86. Id.
87. See infra parts III.A, III.B.
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eral allegations of environmental racism,88 few grassroots
minority organizations or citizens have been successful in the
handful of cases brought to date. Section A examines the use of
42 U.S.C. § 1983,89 a federal statutory cause of action, by
minority citizens. Section B examines the use of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.9° Finally, Section C
examines claims based on zoning challenges, environmental
racism, and procedural violations of state environmental protec-
tion legislation.
A. Section 1983
The first case to draw attention to the racial aspect of envi-
ronmental problems was Bean v. Southwestern Waste Manage-
ment Corp.9 Citizens of Harris County, Texas, brought suit to
challenge a Texas Department of Health (TDH) permitting deci-
sion that allowed Southwestern Management Corporation to
operate a solid waste facility in the area.92 The plaintiffs
sought both a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, arguing that racial discrimination motivated the
decision to grant the permit and that such discrimination vio-
lated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.91
The plaintiffs had to establish four elements to obtain a
preliminary injunction: (1) a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) a
showing that the threatened injury to the plaintiffs outweighs
the threatened harm the injunction may do to the defendants;
and (4) a showing that a preliminary injunction will not dis-
88. See infra part III.C.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
91. 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff/d, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); see also
Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to
Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495, 518-33 (1992) (providing similar
discussions of the cases in Sections A and B of this Part); Godsil, supra note 17, at 413-
16.
92. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 675.
93. Id. at 674-75. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for individuals deprived
of their federal constitutional rights by state officials. The section states that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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serve the public interest.9 4 The court found that the plaintiffs
satisfied the second of these elements, insofar as a deprivation
of constitutional rights could constitute irreparable injury.9 5
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that the opening of the
facility would "affect the entire nature of the community-its
land values, its tax base, its aesthetics, the health and safety of
its inhabitants, and the operation of Smiley High School,
located only 1,700 feet from the site."96 Thus, damages would
not be able to fully compensate plaintiffs for their injuries. 97
However, the court ultimately denied the plaintiffs'
requested relief because the first element was not satisfied.
Using a test established in past U.S. Supreme Court decisions,
the court stated that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving
discriminatory intent." The plaintiffs were required to show
that the decision was directly attributable to an intent to dis-
criminate on the basis of race. 99 Unfortunately, statistical evi-
dence and the plaintiffs' two theories of liability were
insufficient to show such purposeful discrimination. The plain-
tiffs' first theory rested on the assertion that TDH's approval of
the permit was part of a pattern or practice of discrimination by
TDH in the placement of solid waste sites.'0 0 The plaintiffs
presented racial data for the seventeen sites operating with a
TDH permit, which showed that about eighty-two percent (or
fourteen) of the sites were located in census tracts with fifty
percent or less minority population at the time of their open-
ing.' 01 Additionally, in the plaintiffs selected target area, con-
forming roughly to the area of the North Forest Independent
School District and a newly created city council district, there
were two TDH-approved sites.'0 2 One of the sites had less than
a ten percent minority population at the time of its opening,
while the other was located in a census tract with a minority
population of approximately sixty percent. 03 The court con-
94. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 676.
95. Id. at 677.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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cluded that the data failed to establish a practice or pattern.10 4
Thus, the plaintiffs did not sustain their burden. The court did
suggest that more particularized data might have shown that
the sites in predominantly white census tracts were still located
in minority communities. 10 5
The plaintiffs' second theory was that the grant of the per-
mit constituted discrimination when viewed in the context of
the history of waste site placement and the events surrounding
the actual permit application. 0 6 The plaintiffs offered three
sets of data and statistics to support their claim, but the court
decided that the data was insufficient to establish a likelihood
of success in proving discriminatory intent. 10 7 The first set of
data was dismissed because it involved only two solid waste
sites, and the court decided that two was not a statistically sig-
nificant number.10 8 The data included the racial demographics
of the two proposed or existing sites in the target area and
demonstrated only that the challenged site was in an area with
a minority population of approximately fifty-eight percent,
while the existing site had a minority population of roughly
eighteen percent. 0 9 The court determined that no inference of
discrimination could be gleaned from these statistics. 1 0
The second set of statistics involved the total number of
solid waste sites in the earlier defined target area. The plain-
tiffs demonstrated that fifteen percent of Houston's landfills
were located in the target area and that the target area made
up only seven percent of Houston's population."' The plaintiffs
then argued that, because the target area had a seventy percent
minority population, the disparity in environmental burdens
was certainly the result of racial discrimination." 2 The court
disagreed, saying that one would expect such sites to be placed
in more sparsely populated areas. 1 3 Furthermore, the court
pointed to the fact that half of the solid waste sites in the target
area were in census tracts with a more than seventy percent
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 678.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Court found that 42.3% of the city's solid waste sites were located in
minority tracts, whereas 57.7% of the sites were located in white tracts. Id. at 679.
110. Id. at 678.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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white population. 114 The court suggested that some proof that
the sites affected an area larger than the census tract in which
they were located is needed to prove purposeful racial
discrimination. 115
The plaintiffs' final set of data, although more compelling
on its face, was also found to be insufficient. It showed that
only about thirty-two percent of the sites were located in the
western half of Houston, an area in which roughly three
quarters of the white population lived.116 By contrast, nearly
sixty-two percent of the minority population lived in the eastern
half of the city, where over sixty-seven percent of the sites were
located." 7 The court recognized, however, that the location of
Houston's industrial center in the eastern half of the city could
explain the location of many waste sites.1 18 The court also
noted that, by focusing on census tracts, rather than on city
halves or quadrants, the city's solid waste sites no longer
appeared to be so disparately located.' 19 Under this analysis,
predominantly white census tracts did bear a slightly higher
share of solid waste sites than minority tracts. 2 °
While the court ultimately denied both the motion for pre-
liminary injunction and the motion to dismiss, it was highly
sympathetic to the plaintiffs' claims. The court stated that it"simply did not make sense to put a solid waste site so close to a
high school . . . with no air conditioning . .. [or] so close to a
residential neighborhood."' 2 1 Furthermore, the court acknowl-
edged that the "decision to grant the permit was both unfortu-
nate and insensitive," but it reiterated the plaintiffs'
responsibility to prove racial discrimination.' 22 The court then
noted various issues that would need to be addressed in a full
trial and suggested the types of evidence that would be needed
to prevail. These issues included whether sites in most census
tracts (even predominantly white ones) were located next to or
in minority communities, whether alternative sites were consid-
ered before the final permitting process, and whether TDH was
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 679.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 679-80.
122. Id. at 680.
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aware of the racial composition of the neighborhood and the dis-
tribution of solid waste sites in the Houston area. 123
B. The Equal Protection Clause
The next case to raise issues of disproportionate environ-
mental burdens was E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v.
Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Commission.124 In this
case, residents of Macon-Bibb County in Georgia challenged a
decision of the County's planning and zoning commission on
constitutional grounds of racial discrimination. 1 25 The plain-
tiffs argued that they had been deprived of equal protection of
the law when the commission decided to allow the creation of a
private, solid-waste landfill on property located in a census
tract with a sixty-one percent African American population. 126
Using an analysis that mirrored that in Bean, the E. Bibb
Twiggs court also stated that the plaintiffs failed to prove that
the defendant acted with intent to discriminate. 127
The court analyzed the plaintiffs' statistical evidence in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metro Housing Development Corp.'28 In Arling-
ton Heights, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff
need not prove that a racial purpose was the sole, dominant, or
even primary purpose for the challenged action. 129 Rather, the
plaintiff need only show that it was a "motivating factor" in the
decision. 130 Similarly, the district court in E. Bibb Twiggs con-
sidered several factors to determine whether invidious discrimi-
nation was a motivating factor in the commission's decision:
the impact of the official action (i.e., whether it bears more
heavily on one race than another), the historical background of
the decision, the specific events leading up to the decision, any
123. Id.
124. 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989).
125. Id. at 881. The plaintiffs had initially alleged several other claims, including
procedural and substantive due process violations and an illegal taking under the 14th
and 5th Amendments. E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 662 F. Supp. 1465, 1466 (M.D. Ga. 1987), affid, 896 F.2d
1264 (11th Cir. 1989). The federal district judge dismissed these claims for failure to
exhaust state remedies and allowed only the § 1983 claim to go forward. Id. at 1469.
126. E. Bibb Twiggs, 706 F. Supp. at 881.
127. Id. at 884.
128. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
129. Id. at 265-66.
130. Id.
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departures from normal decision-making processes, and the leg-
islative or administrative history of the challenged decision. 13 1
The court first noted that any decision to approve a landfill
in one census tract over another necessarily affects that census
tract more heavily than others.' 32 Furthermore, the decision
will have a greater impact on the majority population, in this
case an African American one.133 Nevertheless, the court
pointed to the only other commission-approved landfill, which
was located in a census tract containing a majority white popu-
lation, to find that there was no "clea[r] pattern, unexplainable
on grounds other than race."134
The plaintiffs then urged the court to analyze the commis-
sion's decision "against an historical background of locating
undesirable land uses in black neighborhoods."' 35 The court,
however, found no such historical discrimination,' 36 in part
because, as one commentator has noted, the court did not con-
sider the county's history of discrimination, but rather
demanded only an examination of the agency's historical dis-
crimination. 3  The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that
the sequence of events prior to the decision illustrated discrimi-
natory intent.135 Because the plaintiffs could produce neither
evidence of sudden changes in the zoning classifications, nor a
relaxation or change in the standards applicable to the granting
of permits, no specific antecedent events demonstrated that the
commission clearly had a racially discriminatory motivation. 39
Furthermore, despite the commission's initial denial of the per-
mit application because of the landfill's proximity to a residen-
tial area, the court found neither a significant departure from
regular decision-making processes nor invidious racial discrimi-
nation in the commission's later decision to reconsider, and ulti-
mately grant, the permit.' 4a The court stated that, overall, the
131. E. Bibb Twiggs, 706 F. Supp. at 884.
132. Id. at 884.
133. Id. (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 885.
136. Id.
137. Godsil, supra note 17, at 413.
138. E. Bibb Twiggs, 706 F. Supp. at 886.
139. Id. Even a report issued by the commission 15 years earlier admitting the
existence of racial discrimination in the area was insufficient. The court stated that an
acknowledgment of past racism did not necessarily mean that the commission's current
decision was influenced by racism. Id. at 885-86.
140. Id. at 886.
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commission appeared to address the siting problem thought-
fully, making its determination based on a careful analysis of
the facts and without any racially discriminatory purpose.'4 1
The Eleventh Circuit later affirmed the nonracially motivated
nature of the commission's landfill decision. 142
Another case involving equal protection claims in connec-
tion with the development of a landfill is R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay. 43
A community organization called R.I.S.E., Inc. (Residents
Involved in Saving the Environment) consists of white and Afri-
can American residents of King & Queen County, Virginia, who
own property in the area of the proposed landfill. 4 4 R.I.S.E.
was organized specifically to oppose the landfill's develop-
ment.145 The landfill proposal arose out of a joint venture with
the Chesapeake Corporation that was designed to ameliorate
King & Queen County's mounting waste disposal problems;
Chesapeake was to build the landfill and use it for its own
waste disposal, and the County was to operate the landfill in
exchange for free waste disposal.146 Chesapeake identified the
420-acre Piedmont Tract as a potential landfill site and con-
ducted tests to establish site suitability. 147 Chesapeake then
abandoned the joint venture negotiations, and, on December 11,
1989, the County board of supervisors executed a purchase
option agreement with Chesapeake for the Piedmont site.141
The proposed landfill was met with considerable public
opposition. On January 25, 1990, citizens met at the Second
Mt. Olive Baptist Church to express concerns that the
increased noise, dust, and odor would decrease area residents'
quality of life; that property values would decline; that worship
and activities at the Church would be disrupted; that major
improvements in roads would be required; and that the historic
Church and community in general would be "blight[ed.]"'1 49 The
board of supervisors then held a public hearing on February 12,
1990, at which area residents presented a petition signed by
141. Id. at 887.
142. See E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and
Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 1989).
143. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd without opinion,
977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
144. Id. at 1145.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1146.
147. Id. at 1149-50.
148. Id. at 1147.
149. Id.
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947 individuals opposing the landfill. 150 Despite public concern
and opposition, the board of supervisors unanimously author-
ized the landfill.15 1
One of the disturbing aspects of the Piedmont site contro-
versy is the racial demographics of King & Queen County's
existing publicly owned landfills. The statistics clearly illus-
trate a history of disproportionate burdens on racial minorities.
For example, the racial composition within a one-mile radius of
the Mascot landfill, sited in 1969, was one hundred percent
African American at the time the landfill was created. 52 Simi-
larly, the Dahlgren landfill, sited in 1971, had an estimated
ninety-five percent African American population living in the
immediate area at the time the landfill was developed.' 53 The
Owenton landfill, sited in 1977, had an estimated one hundred
percent African American population living within a half-mile
radius of the site, and it is still a predominantly minority
community.15 4
The one privately owned and operated site in the County,
the King Land landfill, was developed in 1986, at a time when
there was no zoning ordinance in effect and thus no need to
obtain County approval. 55 Environmentally, the King Land
landfill was a disaster because the operators began dumping
without performing the necessary suitability tests.'56 The
County responded quickly by implementing zoning laws,
obtaining an injunction to prevent the operation of the landfill
under a state-issued permit, and then prohibiting operation of
the site under the new County ordinance. 57 King Land
appealed, but the Board of Zoning Appeals refused to back
down; the Board denied the permit application, finding that a
landfill would cause property values in the surrounding area to
decline and that King Land had "ignored environmental,
health, safety, and welfare concerns." 58 It is significant that
the community surrounding the King Land landfill is predomi-
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1148.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1148-49.
156. Later tests revealed ground water pollution as a result of the landfill's
operation. Id. at 1149.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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nantly white.159 The Board's action in shutting down the King
Land site is suspicious because it was taken with regard to the
landfill in a white community, but not with regard to those in
minority communities.
R.I.S.E. then challenged the County board of supervisors'
decision with respect to the proposed landfill on equal protec-
tion grounds.' 60 After a bench trial, the district court held that
the organization failed to establish that placement of the pro-
posed landfill in a predominantly African American area
stemmed from the type of intentional discrimination prohibited
by the Equal Protection Clause.' 6 '
Although the court concluded that the placement of land-
fills in the county had a disproportionate impact on the area's
African American residents, 62 it nevertheless stated that offi-
cial action does not violate the Equal Protection Clause solely
because it results in racially disproportionate impact.'63
Rather, the action must be intentionally discriminatory or
shown to be motivated by discriminatory intent. 164 The court
further concluded that there was nothing "unusual or suspi-
cious" in the procedural steps or ultimate siting decision of the
board of supervisors.' 65 Rather, the court stated that the
"[b]oard appears to have balanced the economic, environmental,
and cultural needs of the County in a responsible and conscien-
tious manner." 66 Significantly, the court noted that the Equal
Protection Clause does not mandate that officials equalize the
impact of their decisions on different racial groups; therefore,
because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate purposeful dis-
crimination, the court held that the landfill decision was
valid. 167
On appeal, the County board of supervisors prevailed a sec-
ond time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's determination that there was no
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1145.
161. Id. at 1149.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.; see also E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 884 (M.D. Ga.), affd, 896 F.2d 1264
(11th Cir. 1989).
165. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1149-50.
166. Id. at 1150.
167. Id.
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purposeful discrimination.16 The appellate ruling apparently
frees the County to go forward with its plan to lease the land it
had purchased from Chesapeake to Browning-Ferris Industries
(BFI), allowing BFI to begin the landfill project. However, the
members of R.I.S.E. threatened to file a second lawsuit over a
clause in the BFI contract with the County.169 They main-
tained that the clause prevents the County from buying the
land to be leased to BFI as long as the landfill issue is the sub-
ject of litigation.17 ° Thus, by keeping the proposed landfill tied
up in court, the members of R.I.S.E. believe they can prevent
the consummation of the County/BFI deal. 17 1 While this plan of
attack is creative, it is doubtful that the members of R.I.S.E.
will have the stamina or the funds to continue to litigate the
landfill question from different angles ad infinitum.
As illustrated by the cases discussed above, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause has been ineffective in the fight against both the
intentional and unintentional disproportionate imposition of
environmental hazards on minorities. Even when armed with
demographic statistics strongly indicative of invidious racial
discrimination, most minority citizens will be unable to prove
the discriminatory intent required to establish a violation of
either the Equal Protection Clause or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.172 In
many cases, there will be no evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion, only decisions based on the proposals of developers and the
inadequacies of state regulations that impact minority commu-
nities in some way. 173 This resulting lack of a judicial remedy
has led some lawyers to use the law in ingenious ways to pro-
vide assistance to minority communities. 174
C. Other Challenges
Minority residents have also brought procedural and zon-
ing challenges to the placement of environmentally hazardous
facilities in their communities. Residents of the communities of
168. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Lawrence Latane
III, Appeals Court Upholds Verdict Clearing County in Landfill Case, RICHMOND TIMES,
Oct. 17, 1992, at B-4.
169. Lawrence Latane III, Landfill Opponents Threaten Second Lawsuit Over
Contract, RICHMOND TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, at C-3.
170. Id.
171. Latane, supra note 168.
172. See Collin, supra note 91, at 534.
173. Godsil, supra note 17, at 420.
174. Marcia Coyle, Lawyers Thy To Devise New Strategy, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992,
at S8 (special investigation section).
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Garyville and Mount Airy, Louisiana, unsuccessfully challenged
the validity of the rezoning decision that would have allowed
Formosa Plastics to build in Wallace, Louisiana.175 The com-
munities filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive relief, naming St. John the Baptist Parish, the members of
the Parish council, and the Parish president as defendants.176
Aristech Chemical Corporation intervened on the side of the
defendants. 177
The lawsuit challenged the Parish council's decision to
rezone a 432-acre tract of property, purchased by Aristech
Chemical, from residential to heavy industrial.178 The proposed
rezoning would have allowed Aristech Chemical to construct
and operate a chemical facility for the production and distribu-
tion of phenol, acetone, and cumene. 179 In October 1990, the
trial judge dismissed the suit, finding that the council did not
act arbitrarily and capriciously when it rezoned the residents'
residential property.18 0
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in
failing to find (1) that the rezoning was piecemeal, which
requires heightened scrutiny, and (2) that the council acted
arbitrarily and capriciously, insofar as it had failed to under-
take a reasonable evaluation of the effects the proposed zoning
would have on the health, safety, and welfare of Parish resi-
dents.' The appeal was ultimately in vain; the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's ruling in favor of the Parish council. 182
The court stated that it understood
the fears and concerns of the residents of St. John the Baptist
Parish who live near the proposed chemical plant and who
had believed that the adjoining area would remain residen-
tial. However, zoning regulations may be amended under our
state law, and a property owner may not rely on the contin-
ued existence of a classification in his favor.183
175. Save Our Neighborhoods v. St. John the Baptist Parish, 592 So. 2d 908, 909
(La. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 594 So. 2d 892 (La. 1992).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 909-10.
182. Id. at 914.
183. Id.
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The court stated that the plaintiffs had not sustained their bur-
den of proof as to the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the
council's decision.1 4 In September 1992, the Louisiana
Supreme Court refused the plaintiffs' request for another
appeal. 185
Not all such challenges, however, have met with such fail-
ure. One example, using a combination of environmental law
and civil rights law, is the case of El Pueblo Para El Aire YAgua
Limpio v. County of Kings.'86 The case involved Chemical
Waste Management, Inc.'s desire to build a toxic waste inciner-
ator near Kettleman City, California, a community composed
primarily of Latino farm workers.'l 7 The community already
bears its share of pollution sources: Chemical Waste built and
operates a hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal
facility in the same area.18 8 Whether Chemical Waste chose
Kettleman City because it perceived the area's Hispanic popula-
tion as unable to organize opposition is a question open for
debate; Chemical Waste would undoubtedly justify its choice on
more legitimate grounds.' 8 9 However, the minority residents
allege that the proposed incinerator is a clear example of envi-
ronmental racism.' 90
To a certain extent, the question is moot, as the minority
residents proved willing and able to oppose the project. By edu-
cating the community about the proposed project and the poten-
tial danger to human health and the area's environment,
several community residents were able to start a grassroots
movement in the predominantly Latino community.' 9 ' The
resulting community movement barraged the county's board of
supervisors with letters of opposition in Spanish. 92 Unfortu-
nately, the board largely ignored the opposition and approved
the landfill proposal.' 93 Luke Cole, an attorney with California
184. Id.
185. See Warren, supra note 81, at Al.
186. No. 366045 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991).
187. See Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority
Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
69, 70 (1991).
188. Id.
189. Id.; see also Miles Corwin, Unusual Allies Fight Waste Incinerator, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1991, at A3.
190. Katherine L. Ratcliffe, Fusing Civil, Environmental Rights, CHRISTLkN SCi.
MONITOR, May 24, 1991, at 12; see also Corwin, supra note 189.
191. See Ratcliffe, supra note 190, at 12.
192. See Coyle, supra note 174, at S1, 88.
193. Corwin, supra note 189.
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Rural Legal Assistance, and others194 then assisted the resi-
dents in challenging the board's decision using a combination of
environmental law and civil rights law. 195
The "People for Clean Air and Water" fought back by filing
a petition for writ of mandate against the county, challenging
the board's decision on constitutional and civil rights grounds
and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.196 In addition to
charges of environmental racism by Chemical Waste Manage-
ment and the county, 1 97 the plaintiffs argued that the environ-
mental impact report on the proposed project did not comply
with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). 19s
The court ultimately ruled that the decision approving the
permit for construction and operation of the incinerator had to
be set aside. 199 In addition to finding inadequate analyses of air
quality impacts, agricultural impacts, and alternative incinera-
tor sites in the environmental impact report, the court
expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of a Spanish translation
of the environmental impact report, the public meeting notices,
and the public hearing testimony.200 Noting that approxi-
mately forty percent of the community within four miles of the
proposed incinerator was monolingual in Spanish, the court
194. See Stephen G. Hirsch, Big Deals, Big Suits- El Pueblo Para El Aire Y Agua
Limpio v. County of Kings, RECORDER, Feb. 14, 1991, at 2 (also representing the
community were Ralph Santiago Abascal, General Counsel for California Rural Legal
Assistance; Sharon Duggan, a San Francisco-based solo practitioner; and Florence
Roisman of the Washington, D.C. office of the National Housing Law Project).
195. See Jack Viets, Civil Rights Suite Seeks To Block Incinerator, SAN FRANcIsco
CHRON., Feb. 8, 1991, at A20.
196. See Hirsch, supra note 194, at 2. The suit alleged violations of the Civil Rights
Acts of 1966 and 1968, the U.S. and California Constitutions, a county zoning
ordinance, the California Tanner Act governing the siting of hazardous waste dumps,
and the California Environmental Quality Act. Id.
197. The suit alleged not only that Chemical Waste systematically excluded the
Kettleman City residents from the permit process by refusing to translate relevant
documents into Spanish, but also that Chemical Waste chose Kettleman City as the site
for its proposed landfill because the surrounding community is comprised of poor,
Latino farmworkers. See Ratcliffe, supra note 190, at 12; Viets, supra note 195.
198. El Pueblo Para El Aire Y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, No. 366045 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991); see also CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986).
CEQA provides for an "environmental impact report" (EIR), a detailed informational
document considered by the relevant public agency prior to its approval or disapproval
of a proposed project. Id. § 21061. The EIR is intended to provide agencies and the
public with information about the effect of a proposed project on the environment, the
ways in which the significant effects of the project can be minimized, and the existence
of alternatives to the project. Id. The necessity of submitting an EIR is, in California,
determined by the lead agency involved. Id. § 21080.1.
199. County of Kings, No. 366045.
200. Id.
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concluded that any meaningful involvement in the CEQA
review process by these Latino residents was effectively pre-
cluded by the absence of Spanish translations.20 '
This decision is important because it helps ensure that
monolingual minority communities receive the same access to
information as do white communities. It is hoped that this will
assist such communities in organizing challenges to dispropor-
tionate environmental hazards. Still, the usefulness of the deci-
sion has two limitations relating to the manner in which the
rights of the minority community were vindicated. First, not
every permitting and siting decision will reflect inadequacies in
its environmental impact statement or notice and comment pro-
cedures. While the Kettleman City decision may alert other
attorneys to clever ways to get around the lack of a more uni-
form statutory remedy, it also demonstrates the need for just
such a remedy.
The second limitation stems from the message sent to
Chemical Waste Management. Absent from the decision is a
clear signal to polluting industries that it is no longer accepta-
ble to overburden minority communities with environmental
hazards. Rather, the Kettleman City decision simply warns
such industries that, if they do decide to locate in such commu-
nities, they must follow adequate notice procedures and submit
and provide access to proper environmental impact reports and
other relevant documents. Thus, the Kettleman City residents
were lucky this time, particularly so when one considers that
Chemical Waste recently abandoned the entire incinerator pro-
ject.2 2 Had Chemical Waste not made this decision, the court's
ruling would not have deterred the company's attempt to push
the project forward a second time.
The biggest hurdle to judicial relief based on claims of envi-
ronmental racism seems to stem from a dichotomy of thought in
the United States today. While the politically powerful claim
that charges of environmental racism are exaggerated, the hard
statistics and community profiles seem too striking to ignore.
Residents of minority communities, those who actually live in
the polluted areas, continue to point to their surroundings and
claim that actions (and resulting impacts) speak louder than
201. Id. Chemical Waste Management later appealed the superior court's ruling
on its environmental impact report in an attempt to reverse the judge's determination of
inadequacy. Waste Dump Ruling Appealed, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 21, 1992, at B3.
202. See Firm Withdraws Its Plan for Toxic Waste Incinerator, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8,
1993, at A15.
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words. But, to date, claims based on environmental racism are
rare and ineffective. As the Kettleman City case demonstrates,
the strongest claims available to grassroots organizations are
those challenges based on highly technical imperfections in sit-
ing and zoning procedures. Legislators have, at least to date,
been unwilling to change the laws to permit validation of the
concept of environmental racism in court, and the courts have
been hesitant to extend current protections in innovative ways.
Accordingly, perhaps it is time to move away from claims of
environmental racism and causes of action requiring a showing
of purposeful racial discrimination. Such tools have proved
ineffective because claims of environmental racism are too diffi-
cult to substantiate, and, therefore, they have not ameliorated
the injustice of the current unequal burdens. It might be more
advantageous to enact new legislation that focuses instead on
the clear inequity and injustice that exist with regard to envi-
ronmental burdens. The unequal burdens among communities
need to be addressed directly and immediately, not dismissed as
insufficiently documented under existing theories. The pro-
posed Environmental Justice Act of 1993, considered in Part IV,
represents a move in this direction.
IV. THE PROPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1993:
No SOLUTION
The proposed Environmental Justice Act of 1993203 is
designed to "establish a program to assure nondiscriminatory
compliance with all environmental, health and safety laws and
to assure equal protection of the public health."2°4 Because
House Bill 2105205 is nearly identical to the original 1992 ver-
sion of the Act, was introduced prior to the companion bill in the
Senate, and is more comprehensive than the Senate version,
this Comment will make reference primarily to House Bill
2105.206 Section A of this Part describes the various provisions
203. See supra note 5.
204. H.R. 2105, supra note 5; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
205. H.R. 2105, supra note 5.
206. Although it omits any discussion of siting moratoriums in communities
already heavily burdened by environmental hazards, the Senate bill does contain an
additional section articulating the findings that necessitated the introduction of the Act.
See S. 1161, supra note 5, § 2. The section states that "[o]ver 3.5 billion pounds of toxic
releases were reported by approximately 19,600 industrial plants in 1990, under the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act" and that many additional
toxic chemicals "posing substantial health threats as a result of releases are not being
reported." Id. Furthermore, "[allthough environmental and health data of toxic
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of the draft legislation, and Section B identifies the potential
weaknesses and criticisms of the legislation and discusses the
likely ineffectiveness of the Act if passed into law.
A. The Provisions of the Environmental Justice Act
Section 2 of the proposed Environmental Justice Act pro-
vides a list of the major purposes and policies of the Act.2 °7
First, the Act requires the collection of data on environmental
health effects, particularly those caused by emissions in high
impact areas, so that impacts on various groups and individuals
can be better understood.2 °8 Once this is accomplished, the Act
mandates the identification of areas in the nation that are sub-
ject to the highest amount of toxic chemicals.2 °9 Section 2 man-
dates that "lactivities found to be having significant adverse
impacts on human health in those areas of highest impact" be
curtailed.2 10 Furthermore, the Act intends to provide individ-
ual citizens and groups residing in high impact areas with the
opportunity and resources to participate in the processes that
lead to the siting and permitting of environmental hazards.2 1 '
Overall, section 2 states the ultimate goal of the Act, which is
an equitable distribution of the "significant adverse health
chemical releases are not routinely collected and analyzed by income and race, racial
and ethnic minorities and lower income Americans may be disproportionately exposed
to toxic chemicals in their residential and workplace environments." Id.
207. Section 2 of House Bill 2105 provides the following:
The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to require the collection of data on environmental health effects so that
impacts on different individuals or groups can be understood;
(2) to identify those areas which are subject to the highest loadings of toxic
chemicals, through all media;
(3) to assess the health effects that may be caused by emissions in those areas
of highest impact;
(4) to ensure that groups or individuals residing within those areas of highest
impact have the opportunity and the resources to participate in the technical
process which will determine the possible existence of adverse health impacts;
(5) to require that actions be taken by authorized Federal agencies to curtail
those activities found to be having significant adverse impacts on human
health in those areas of highest impact; and
(6) to ensure that significant adverse health impacts that may be associated
with environmental pollution in the United States are not distributed
inequitably.
H.R. 2105, supra note 5, § 2.
208. Id. § 2(2).
209. Id. § (1).
210. Id. § 2(5).
211. Id. § 2(4).
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impacts that may be associated with environmental pollution in
the United States."212
Section 101 of the Act provides working definitions and ter-
minology for the legislation. 213 "Environmental High Impact
Areas" (EHIAs) are defined as any of the one hundred counties
"with the highest total weight of toxic chemicals present during
the course of the most recent 5-year period for which data is
available."21 4 "Toxic chemicals" are defined to include the pollu-
tants covered by the major hazardous waste laws in the United
States.21 5  "Toxic chemical facilities" are similarly defined
according to the major permitting, inspection, and registration
laws.21 6 Finally, section 101 states that control over the admin-
istration and activities of the Act would be placed in the hands
of the EPA Administrator and the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS).217
The actual substantive material of the Act begins with sec-
tion 102. First, within twelve months after passage of the Act,
the EPA Administrator must publish a list in rank order of the
total weight of toxic chemicals present in each county in the
United States during the most recent 5-year period for which
data is available. 218 From this list, one hundred counties will
be designated EHLAs. 219 Next, section 102 provides the method
by which the total weight of toxic chemicals is to be calcu-
lated.22 ° Not only is an adjustment mandated for the relative
toxicity of the chemicals, but the data would also distinguish
between toxic chemicals in a contained environment and those
released into the air, water, soil, or ground water. 221 These
methods of calculation would be subject to public comment
212. Id. § 2(6).
213. Id. § 101.
214. Id. § 101(2).
215. Id. § 101(4). This term would include hazardous substances under CERCLA,
42 U.S.C. 88 9601-9675 (1988), pollutants for which air quality standards have been
issued under the Clean Air Act, id. §§ 7401-7671, pollutants for which water quality
standards have been issued under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1988), materials registered pursuant to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988), and all substances and
chemicals subject to reporting requirements under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988). Id.
216. H.R. 2105, supra note 5, § 101(5).
217. Id. § 101(1), (3).
218. Id. § 102(b). The 1992 version of the Act allowed the EPA only nine months to
publish the list. H.R. 5326, supra note 1, § 102(a).
219. H.R. 2105, supra note 5, § 102(b).
220. Id. § 102(c).
221. Id. § 102(c)(5).
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within six months after the date of the Act's enactment.222
Finally, the EHIA list would be revised and republished every
223five years.
Section 201 would authorize the EPA Administrator and
the Secretary of Labor, acting through the Assistant Secretary
for Occupational Safety and Health, to "conduct compliance
inspections or reviews of all toxic chemical facilities [in EHIAs]
... within 2 years after the enactment of this Act, and not less
than every 2 years thereafter."224 In this way, the Act envisions
that facilities with the highest potential for toxic pollution will
be required to operate in compliance with applicable environ-
mental, health, and safety regulations.
Section 301 represents a particularly interesting and inno-
vative aspect of the Act. It would provide for "technical assist-
ance grants" (TAGs) to facilitate access by representatives of
EHIAs to public participation.2 2 5 The grants would enable
EHIA communities to disseminate information more effectively
and stage successful campaigns to mandate operation morato-
ria and cleanups. The TAGs would be awarded to individuals or
organizations that either are or may be affected by pollutants
from toxic chemical facilities in EHIAs and would not exceed
fifty thousand dollars.226 Grant recipients would be required to
pay a nonfederal share equal to twenty percent of the grant
amount, but a demonstration of financial need would waive this
requirement.227 Only one grant per EHIA per grant period
would be awarded.228 Renewals would be determined by the
EPA Administrator on a case-by-case basis.229
Former Senator Gore, in a Capitol Hill hearing, stressed
that the funding for the TAGs would be based on the "polluters
pay" principle and would not come from taxpayers. 30 Section
302 describes a system of user fees or assessments that would
be placed on toxic chemical facilities in EHIAs.231 The money
obtained from these fees would be placed in a special fund, out
222. Id. § 102(d).
223. Id. § 102(e).
224. Id. § 201.
225. Id. § 301.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 3.
231. H.R. 2105, supra note 5, § 302.
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of which the TAGs would be financed.232 In addition, any funds
expended by the EPA to create the initial list of EHIAs would be
reimbursed out of the TAG fund.2 33
Section 401 provides that, within two years after enact-
ment of the legislation, agency heads 234 must promulgate for
public comment a report identifying the nature and extent of
any acute and chronic impacts on human health in EHIAs, as
compared to other counties.235 In issuing the report, the
Administrator of the Agency for Toxic Substances Disease Reg-
istry of DHHS shall assist in helping to isolate the impacts of
environmental pollution from other factors, such as health care
availability and substance abuse.236 DHHS shall also assist in
ranking the toxic chemical risks in the EHIAs and determining
the levels below which release of toxic chemicals must be
reduced to avoid the adverse health impacts.237
The foregoing sections of the proposed legislation have a
relatively prospective, preventive slant. Sections 402 and 403 of
House Bill 2105 detail the more substantive, remedial aspects
of the Act. "If the report under section 401 identifies significant
adverse impacts of environmental pollution on human health in
EHIAs ... the President shall submit to Congress, within one
232. Id.
233. Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 3.
234. Agency heads included are the Secretary of DHHS, in consultation with the
EPA Administrator, Secretary of Labor, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and
Commissioners of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. H.R. 2105, supra note 5, § 401.
235. Id. ("Such impacts shall include but not be limited to cancer, birth deformities,
infant mortality rates, and respiratory diseases.").
236. Id.
237. The report shall seek to
(1) isolate the impacts of environmental pollution;
(2) segregate the effects of other factors such as health care availability or
substance abuse or diet;
(3) rank the relative risks posed by the toxic chemicals present in EHIAs and
by the varied sources of toxic chemicals, both individually and cumulatively;
(4) take into account the need to remedy the impacts of pollution in high
population density areas;
(5) evaluate the levels below which release of toxic chemicals, either
individually or cumulatively, must be reduced to avoid adverse impacts on
human health; and
(6) determine the impacts of uncontrolled releases.
As a result of the report in communities where the Administrator of the Agency
for Toxic Substances Disease Registry has determined that adverse health
impacts exist, the agency shall also make this information readily available to
members of the community by providing information directly to the affected
communities and tribal governments in the Environmental High Impact Areas
about the release of toxic chemicals and the potential effects of such exposure.
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year after publication of the report, proposed legislation to rem-
edy and prevent such impacts."23 The legislation must include
the following: (1) expansion of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986239 to require additional
facilities or chemicals to be subject to the Act's reporting
requirements; (2) means to redress regulatory loopholes under
existing legislation (such as recycling exemptions); and (3)
measures such as taxes on uncontrolled or controlled emissions,
or restrictions on toxic chemical releasing activities within
EHIAs to induce source reduction in these areas. 240 Another
provision, not present in the 1992 version of the Act, mandates
that within two years after publication of the section 401 report
on health impacts, the EPA Administrator report to Congress,
identifying "all of the changes made or recommended to be
made to the Environmental Protection Agency's existing regula-
tions, the purpose for each change, and the goals to be achieved
as a result of the substantive changes."241 The regulatory
changes not made because of conflicting statutory mandates or
the lack of statutory authority must also be noted.242 The Presi-
dent shall then propose legislation to remedy such problems
within three years after publication of the health impact
report.243
In addition, if the report identifies any acute and chronic
adverse impacts on health from environmental pollution in par-
ticular EHIAs, section 403 provides for a siting or permitting
moratorium in the affected EHIAs.244 The moratorium provi-
sion states that the "siting or permitting of any new toxic chem-
ical facility in any [adversely impacted] EHIA shown to emit
toxic chemicals in quantities found to cause significant adverse
impacts on human health" will be prohibited.2 45 The morato-
rium period must continue in such EHIAs "until the [EPA]
Administrator determines, upon petition of any interested
party, that the health-based levels identified pursuant to sec-
tion 401(5) have been attained [in] the EHIA."246
238. Id. § 402(a).
239. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988).
240. H.R. 2105, supra note 5, § 402(a).
241. Id. § 402(b).
242. Id.
243. Id. § 402(c).
244. Id. § 403.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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This moratorium provision is the only provision that pro-
vides minority communities with any true relief. It is entirely
absent from the Senate bill. For this reason, the House version
is much better suited to the task of correcting the problem of
unequal environmental burdens. However, the effectiveness of
House Bill 2105 is also severely weakened by a fairly broad
exception to the moratorium provision. Section 403 states that
a new toxic chemical facility may still be located or permitted in
adversely impacted EHIAs during the moratorium period
if (1) the need for the activity is shown to the Secretary [of
DHHS]; (2) the owner or operator of the facility demonstrates
that the facility will develop a plan and maintain a compre-
hensive pollution prevention program; and (3) the facility
demonstrates that it will minimize uncontrolled releases into
the environment.247
B. Criticisms and Weaknesses of the Environmental
Justice Act
1. The Environmental Justice Act Lacks a Racial Nexus
House Bill 2105's failure to acknowledge any connection
between race and environmental burdens provokes the first
criticism. Just as the EPA's Environmental Equity report248
was careful not to state directly that a real disparity of burdens
exists between minority and nonminority communities, the Act
is unwilling to face the racial issue head on and look for mean-
ingful solutions. This failure is unacceptable, particularly when
the studies and cases to date have provided ample evidence
nationwide of unequal burdens along racial lines.249 Thus, the
muted tone of House Bill 2105, like the EPA's report, appears to
question the validity and gravity of the nation's problem of envi-
ronmental inequity.
The Act may intentionally downplay the racial aspect of the
issue as a kind of political compromise. Perhaps the use of envi-
ronmental racism as a mobilizing phrase in past conferences
and studies has been too sensationalist, insofar as one can
always point to cases of unintentional inequity not amounting
to racism per se. 5° Certainly, with the law's requirement of a
247. Id.
248. See supra part II.B.3.
249. See supra parts II, III.
250. One commentator has noted that the term "racism" is highly charged and"should be a term of special opprobrium... [insofar as] [w]e risk having the term lose
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452 University of Puget Sound Law Review
showing of intent to discriminate, allegations of racial discrimi-
nation in the environmental context have so far proved difficult
to substantiate. Furthermore, much of the statistical evidence
does suggest that a degree of socioeconomic discrimination, in
addition to racial discrimination, is at work in the siting of haz-
ardous facilities and in policymaking. Consequently, the legis-
lation may have been drafted with the recognition that, if
minority citizens cry wolf too many times in connection with
racism, more striking claims of racism and racial discrimination
are more likely to go unheeded. Thus, the lack of a racial nexus
in the Act may represent an attempt to make the Act more uni-
versally acceptable.
This idea is not without its intuitive appeal. House Bill
2105's use of the terms "equity" and "justice" arguably make
some sense. Because the legislation's focus on environmental
justice and equity would encompass both the racial and poverty
aspects of the present inequities and because race and poverty
are so often closely related in our society, it can be argued that
the legislation's current terms make it better suited to the task
at hand. After all, a fairness argument against overburdening
racial minority communities applies with equal force to low
socioeconomic communities; in both cases, these are the commu-
nities least able to deal with the burden.
Still, the complete avoidance of the connection between
race and environmental burdens weakens the legislation.25 '
Even if allegations of racism were set aside, the reasons for tak-
ing immediate and decisive action to protect racial minorities
would remain. Even the EPA's report, which did not specifi-
cally acknowledge the problem in terms of racism, stated that
"[a]lthough more information is definitely needed in order to
fully understand all the ramifications of environmental injus-
tice, the evidence is considerably more than ample that the
its condemnatory force by using it too often or inappropriately." Gerald Torres,
Introduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 839, 839
(1992). However, Professor Torres also recognizes that "environmental regulations...
have a potentially racial impact and the willful ignorance of that impact may itself be
racist even if the intention behind the rule had no racial animus at all." Id. at 840. It is
simply not enough to "claim color-blindness where a demonstrable impact on
subordinated racial groups exists." Id. (citing Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 ST. L. REV. 1 (1991)).
251. The Senate bill at least mentions the connection between race and
environmental burdens in its section covering congressional findings. S. 1161, supra
note 5, § 2(3).
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problem exists."2 52 The data and statistics may not prove inten-
tional racial discrimination or blatant racism, but they clearly
demonstrate inequity along racial lines. Thus, proposed legisla-
tion must acknowledge this racial connection and indicate a
willingness to work toward a solution. House Bill 2105 in its
present form, with absolutely no mention of race, simply does
not do this. Because the legislative history of the Act discusses
the racial issues presented by environmental inequity, it is
strange indeed that the text of the Act completely avoids such
issues.
2. The Environmental Justice Act Lacks an Immediate
Response
A second criticism concerns the timeline established in the
Act, which is inadequate to address environmental inequity.
Currently, the proposed legislation states that the EPA Admin-
istrator will compile the necessary data and determine the one
hundred EHIAs within twelve months of the Act's enactment 253
and that, within two years after enactment, the Secretary of
DHHS will determine whether there are significant adverse
impacts on human health in these areas.25 4 Only after that
determination is made does the legislation authorize congres-
sional action; the President then has up to one year after publi-
cation of the report to submit proposed legislation to
Congress.2 5 5
This is an excessively long time to wait for a solution.
Admittedly, it will take awhile to compile the data for each
county. Nevertheless, within just the initial period of twelve
months, many more facilities can and will be sited throughout
the country. Furthermore, during the minimum three year
period between the time the EPA Administrator compiles the
data and Congress passes remedial legislation, several new
counties might qualify as EHIAs, and the original data would
be highly outdated. This delay is unacceptable. Certain coun-
ties, like the county encompassing Cancer Alley, are obviously
environmental high impact areas and would benefit greatly by
an immediate, interim moratorium period.
252. 2 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 41, at 81.
253. H.R. 2105, supra note 5, § 102(a), (b).
254. Id. § 401.
255. Id. § 402(a).
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3. The Environmental Justice Act Loses Sight of
the Equity Goal
The Act's deficient treatment of environmental equity con-
stitutes the third criticism. Both the Act and the EPA's report
stress environmental equity as their goal, insofar as they both
envision equalizing the burdens caused by polluting industries
and factories.25 6 Still, the Act does not go as far as it could
toward establishing environmental equity.
Equity connotes the state of being just and fair. This is
clearly a worthy goal for society, and one on which our demo-
cratic system is based. Obviously, it is impossible to enact legis-
lation that requires every county to have a landfill or
incinerator or chemical plant. There are geological and other
considerations that factor into the viability of a site for such
facilities. Nevertheless, pursuing the goal of equity in the envi-
ronmental context promises to make all individuals better off.
As areas other than poor and minority communities are
required to share the pollution burden, wealthier, predomi-
nantly white communities will have a greater incentive to use
their political power and financial resources to effect a decrease
in overall pollution, as opposed to simply claiming NIMBY 257
for their own benefit.
Policy considerations, then, require legislation that is bet-
ter able to reach the goals of fairness and equity articulated in
its provisions. To begin with, the Act proposed to set aside only
one hundred heavily affected counties, so as to make them eligi-
ble for TAGs and moratoria.258 In reality, there are likely to be
hundreds of counties that are truly, dangerously affected by
environmental hazards and that urgently require redistribution
256. House Bill 2105 states that one of its purposes is "to ensure that significant
adverse health impacts that may be associated with environmental pollution in the
United States are not distributed inequitably." Id. § 2. Similarly, the EPA Workgroup
stated that the goals behind its report included "focus[ing] the attention of EPA officials
and staff on environmental equity issues." 1 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra
note 41, at 4. The Workgroup recommended that the EPA review and revise its "permit,
grant, monitoring and enforcement procedures to address high concentrations of risk in
racial minority and low-income communities" and "incorporate [the concept of
environment equity] in its long-term planning and operations." Id.
257. "NIMBY" is an acronym for "not-in-my-backyard" and refers generally to
public opposition to local siting decisions. See The N.I.M.B.Y Syndrome Meets the
Preemption Doctrine: Federal Preemption of State and Local Restrictions on the Siting
of Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities, 53 LA. L. REV. 229, 229-30 (1992); see also
Daniel M. Weisberg, Comment, Taking Out the Trash-Where Will We Put All This
Garbage?, 10 PACE ENV rL. L. REV. 925, 926 n.8 (1993).
258. H.R. 2105, supra note 5, § 102(b).
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of their pollution burdens. The effect of the provision as written
would be to allow these counties that are still relatively heavily
burdened, but not in the top one hundred, to have additional
landfills and sites located in them, even though they may have
several facilities already. As the Act states in section 102,
changing the list of the top one hundred EHIAs takes five years,
which would clearly be too late and quite inequitable for these
newly burdened counties.25 9
In yet another respect, the Act is not well designed to
achieve its goal of equity. While the legislation provides for a
moratorium on siting and permitting in the EHIAs, it also offers
a massive loophole. Instead of prohibiting absolutely the siting
of new facilities and industries in an EHIA, the proposed Act
mandates a moratorium on permitting and siting in the EHIAs
unless "the need for the activity is shown to the Secretary [of
DHHS]." 2 60 Notably, the Act does not require substantial hard-
ship or a similarly strict showing of need. In fact, the Act does
not provide any sort of guidance about what level or type of
need the Secretary is allowed to consider. Thus, a county could
be designated an EHIA, but still be subjected to further envi-
ronmental risks and burdens as a result of the Secretary's deci-
sion. Was not the whole purpose of designating a county an
EHIA to protect it from further disproportionate environmental
degradation? The exception in section 403 of the Act defeats the
whole purpose behind the EHIA designation.
A final aspect along these lines needs consideration. The
Act provides for one hundred counties to act as the target areas.
This emphasis on counties, as opposed to smaller units, is not
well suited to achieving the equity goal. Not only are there
likely to be many more than one hundred target areas, but this
emphasis does nothing to address the discrimination that goes
on at the more localized level (i.e., within a particular county).
It is absurd to target counties when the pollution or environ-
mental burden could be located in an African American district
of a predominantly white county. As exemplified by the
problems in Virginia's King & Queen County and in Louisiana's
St. John the Baptist Parish,261 the environmental inequity is
often more pervasive than county by county; the unequal bur-
dens along racial lines may run as deep as town by town or
259. Id. § 102(e).
260. Id. § 403.
261. See supra notes 143-171, 175-185 and accompanying text.
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neighborhood by neighborhood. For example, assuming that a
predominantly white county is designated an EHIA because of
the extraordinary amount of environmental burdens located in
its minority census tracts, the placement of a moratorium on
siting and permitting in that county could even sanction the
traditionally white NIMBY syndrome by prohibiting new facili-
ties in this mostly white county.
4. The Environmental Justice Act Avoids the Siting Problem
A fourth weakness of the Act is its failure to address the
siting process, which is one of the major causes of disproportion-
ate pollution burdens in the waste management context. To
develop a workable solution to this problem, one must recognize
that current siting procedures have brought about inequitable
siting. Currently, siting processes vary from state to state and
from locality to locality within a state, and decisions are made
by state or local officials. Local decision making occurs because
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),262 which
provides federal guidelines for all aspects of hazardous waste
management and disposal, generally leaves the siting issue to
the states.263
States tend to follow one of three basic approaches to site
selection for hazardous waste facilities: super review, local con-
trol, or site designation.264 Under the super review approach, a
private developer selects a site and a state agency reviews the
selection.265 If the site is acceptable, the designated agency
issues the permit, after allowing for participation by local resi-
dents.266 In all states that utilize this procedure, a preemption
clause allows the agency to ignore any local opposition if the
agency is unable to eliminate it. 267
Under the local control approach to site selection, a city or
district may enact strict land use regulations to block any pollu-
tion facility. u68 Because state waste management plans do not
necessarily preempt local land use decisions, the state may not
262. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949(a) (1988).
263. Godsil, supra note 17, at 401. Godsil also suggests that an amendment to
RCRA and the model state legislation might be sufficient to prevent discriminatory
siting decisions at the state level. Id. at 421-25.
264. Id. at 403; see also Collin, supra note 91, at 511.
265. Godsil, supra note 17, at 403.
266. Id. at 404.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 406. California and Florida both adhere to such an approach. Id.
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have the power to stop consistent refusal of a city or district to
bear a fair share of the pollution.269 This method is the most
harmful of the three approaches to minority communities, as
the state cannot force an area to accept a hazardous facility,
and the NIMBY syndrome can simply run rampant in commu-
nities with more wealth and political clout.2 7 0
Under the site designation approach, a state agency or
board creates a list of possible sites.2 7 1 This approach may be
better suited to achieving equity than the super review
approach because "the state, unlike [a private] developer, is not
motivated by profit."272 The state is far less likely to choose
sites for purely economic reasons and is better suited to ensure
that no one community becomes inequitably burdened. 273 Still,
the site designation approach also has its problems. Municipal-
ities, state agencies, and lobbyists from various private groups
will still attempt to manipulate the system and remove their
cities or counties from the list of potential sites. Thus, although
minority communities are probably better off with the site
designation approach, it is certainly not the answer in all cases
to the problem of unequal environmental burdens.
Moreover, although minority citizens have used challenges
to siting, permitting, and zoning decisions and processes as
tools for challenging the disproportionate environmental bur-
dens they must bear, cases such as Save Our Neighborhoods274
and R.I.S.E.275 illustrate the limits of these tools' usefulness.
What the Act needs is revised siting powers and rules. A revi-
sion of the siting power left to states under RCRA would
address only hazardous waste facilities; although it would give
minority communities some relief from unequal waste manage-
ment burdens, relief is also needed in the siting of chemical and
industrial plants and other "LULUs."2 76 Revisors must con-
sider all aspects of the siting issue; only by tackling the heart of
the matter will they find any real and lasting solution to envi-
ronmental inequities.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 407.
271. Id. at 405.
272. Id. at 406.
273. Collin, supra note 91, at 512.
274. See supra notes 175-185 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 143-171 and accompanying text.
276. "LULU" refers to any locally unwanted land use. Collin, supra note 91, at 509.
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5. The Environmental Justice Act Lacks a Meaningful
Redress
a. The Act Fails To Address the Problem of Unequal
Sanctions
A fifth problem with the current form of the Act is that it
fails to address or remedy the inequity in assessing fines for
pollution violations. The NLJ study concluded that companies
and individuals who pollute in white neighborhoods must pay
much higher fines than those who pollute in minority communi-
ties. 7 This practice encourages both the placement of hazard-
ous industries in minority communities and the resulting
pollution of those communities. Yet, the Act is entirely silent on
this disturbing issue.
b. The Act Fails To Provide an Effective Legal Tool
Finally, the Act lacks a means by which disproportionately
impacted citizens can seek redress and mandate enforcement of
its provisions. Noting the dismal results achieved in Equal Pro-
tection Clause cases, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, and claims of
inadequate environmental impact statements or inadequate
notice, it is apparent that a new legal tool is needed. Unfortu-
nately, the Act provides little tangible assistance to minority
citizens in their fight against unequal environmental burdens.
The one area in which the legislation is relatively strong is
in its attempt to facilitate communication between citizens and
their local, state, and federal governments. The TAGs would
help minority residents obtain information regarding environ-
mental hazards in their area and perhaps obtain legal counsel if
litigation became necessary. By fostering information sharing,
the Act would empower the disproportionately impacted citi-
zens of the United States.
Obviously, a great deal of work will be involved in deter-
mining the one hundred counties that qualify as EHIAs and
that qualify for assistance in the form of TAGs. However, it is
likely that the parishes that comprise the infamous Cancer
Alley, for example, would qualify as an EHIA by way of their
sheer number of toxic chemical producing plants and other
facilities. Other counties, such as the one incorporating Chi-
cago's South Side, might also qualify because of their many
abandoned waste sites and the manifestations of serious ill-
277. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 15, at S2.
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nesses in the area's residents. In addition, TAGs would assist
community organizations in areas such as Kettleman City and
Chicago's South Side. With money to disseminate information,
mobilize public opposition, and even file suit, grassroots organi-
zations might be able to discourage placement of environmen-
tally hazardous facilities in their neighborhoods at the outset.
As beneficial as the TAGs would be, they would be even bet-
ter if coupled with a way to effectively challenge the dispropor-
tionately burdensome decisions already in effect. Having
information on projects and the money to challenge them are
useful in staging grassroots opposition in the initial planning
stages, but they are of much less use to these communities in
challenging the decision once it has been made. This is because,
as Part III demonstrated, the existing legal tools available to
these communities have proved unworkable. Although the
Environmental Justice Act is designed to provide "information,
confidence in the system of regulations designed to protect
[minority communities], and a better ability to be heard when
they have concerns,"278 it fails to achieve the third of these
aims. Unless House Bill 2105 is rewritten to provide the means
by which these communities can challenge the inequities they
suffer and can be heard at the policymaking and judicial deci-
sion-making levels, the Act will not achieve its objectives.
V. CREATING A MORE EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE ACT
One commentator suggests that legislation is needed to
remedy the effects of environmental racism and to provide a
cause of action for minority residents attempting to challenge
siting decisions. 279 The proposed Environmental Justice Act of
1993 is not at all what that commentator envisioned. It may be
a step in the right direction, but it is not powerful enough to
provide any real assistance to minority communities. Minority
citizens need stronger legislation that will assist them in chal-
lenging the permitting and siting of environmentally hazardous
facilities at both the initial planning stages and at later stages
when the projects are underway. Stronger legislation must also
mandate the timely and efficient cleanup of existing and aban-
doned sites.
278. Capitol Hill Hearing, supra note 3.
279. Godsil, supra note 17, at 421-25.
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Part V of this Comment addresses the revisions necessary
to make the Environmental Justice Act a more effective weapon
to fight environmental inequity. Section A of this Part provides
suggestions for more immediacy in the Act. Section B discusses
possible revisions of the Act to refocus on the goal of equity.
Section C proposes a revision of the Act to include better state
siting procedures that use state "fair share siting laws." Section
D discusses the need for equal sanctions for equal violations.
Section E addresses the concept of racial impact statements
and racial impact mapping. Finally, Section F suggests that the
Act include an "environmental inequity action."
A. Providing Immediacy of Action
In Part IV.B.2, this Comment discussed the proposed Act's
lack of provisions that mandate immediate action. To remedy
this, the authors of the Act should focus on sections 102 and 402
of the proposed Act.2"' Section 102 provides the EPA Adminis-
trator with one year to compile the data necessary to determine
the one hundred EHIAs. Section 402 provides that, if the report
required under section 401 identifies any significant adverse
impacts of environmental pollution on human health in the
EHIAs, the President shall submit to Congress proposed legis-
lation designed to prevent and remedy such impacts up to three
years later.281 The Act then suggests several legislative
responses, including the expansion of the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-To-Know Act and the adoption of means
to redress regulatory loopholes in other related legislation.28 2
As noted, the section 102 delay, coupled with the several
year delays contemplated by sections 401 and 402, will allow
new facilities to be sited and additional counties to qualify as
EHIAs. This is unacceptable. Rather than postponing all
action for several years, the Act should include provisions for
some type of immediate response that will allow concurrent
study and compilation of data. Furthermore, the legislative
measures contemplated by section 402 should be enacted as
part of the Act. Although smaller, piecemeal legislation often
has a greater chance of passage than large, unwieldy bills, it is
clear that legislative responses of the type mentioned in section
402 are needed immediately to address the problem of environ-
280. H.R. 2105, supra note 5, § 402.
281. Id. § 402(a).
282. Id.
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mental inequity. Such legislative measures would serve to fos-
ter the idea of equity by alleviating some of the fear and
skepticism of, and providing extra protection for, impacted com-
munities. Moreover, these measures would not preclude taking
additional measures once the report is finalized. Overall, pro-
viding some degree of immediacy in the Act would strengthen
the legislation, ensuring that it is not merely a feel-good
proposal.
B. Striving for Equity Again
In Part IV.B.3, this Comment discussed the Act's failure to
remain consistent with its goal of equity. As the subsection sug-
gested, the Act should not use counties as the target area.
Counties are simply too large; by breaking the target areas into
smaller components, such as cities, districts, towns, or neigh-
borhoods, the Act would address environmental inequity at a
more localized level. Because of the sheer number of these
smaller components, the Act would need to be rewritten to
increase the number of possible EHIAs to a level that would
provide more comprehensive protection to the actual number of
communities at risk. In a country the size of the United States,
the Act's provision for only one hundred EHIAs is simply
unrealistic and inadequate.
As a second related point, the authors of the Act must reex-
amine the moratorium exception.28 3 To achieve the goal of
equity, an absolute ban on siting and permitting, rather than a
qualified ban, is needed in areas designated as EHIAs. If, how-
ever, the need for some kind of loophole is truly justified, at the
very least, the language of the Act should narrow the scope of
the exception as much as possible. For example, the Act could
require that all alternative sites be considered and exhausted
prior to requesting an exemption from the moratorium.
Another suggestion would be to exclude exemptions based on
increased costs, unless the Secretary of DHHS agrees that the
costs of siting or permitting in an already environmentally bur-
dened community are truly exorbitant, as opposed to merely
inconvenient.
Clearly, if we are to achieve equity in the distribution of
polluting facilities, a more narrowly tailored exception to the
283. The moratorium provision is conspicuously absent from the Senate bill. This
provision, which provides some degree of protection for affected communities, must be
included in an effective version of the Act.
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moratorium provision must be developed. For example, the Act
could provide that all cities and districts are eligible for pollut-
ing facilities or industries with only two exceptions: (1) proven
geological or technological impossibility, and (2) the city or dis-
trict already has one hazardous facility and there are other eli-
gible locations. The goal would be to ensure that all
communities must bear at least one pollution source, be it a gar-
bage dump, toxic waste incinerator, or chemical plant. To
equalize the burden further, the relative toxicity of the facility
could be offset by a fee or other monetary assessment in the
communities that are lightly burdened. Similarly, communities
with geological limitation exemptions would have to contribute
to the TAG fund under the Act.
This narrowing of the moratorium loophole might increase
costs. Still, even if it raises the cost of waste disposal or indus-
try operations, the increase would be ultimately beneficial. As
the costs of finding sites for landfills and petrochemical plants
that do not overly burden minorities and the poor increase, soci-
ety will have a greater incentive to reduce overall pollution by
recycling and by using alternative goods.
Because pollution is a growing problem to which every indi-
vidual contributes, the goal of equity requires that each individ-
ual and each locality be forced to deal with it in equal shares.
Restated another way, this means that no one group of individ-
uals, such as the minority residents of our counties and states,
should be forced to deal with a disproportionate share.
C. State Laws Based on Fair Share Siting
A major weakness of the Environmental Justice Act is its
failure to urge each target area in the nation to carry its fair
share of the environmental burdens associated with twentieth
century society. This Section suggests that the Act be revised to
deny funding to states that fail to adopt some type of "fair share
siting" legislation. Fair share siting legislation, used in connec-
tion with environmentally hazardous industries and facilities,
would reduce the disproportionate burdens on minorities and
open up many predominantly white suburbs to the placement of
these industries and facilities. The fair share siting legislation
would be modeled after state affordable housing laws and would
provide an effective alternative to both a federal siting board
and many of the current state siting practices.
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An excellent example of fair share siting is found in Califor-
nia's affordable housing legislation.28 4 The legislation attempts
to mandate the equitable distribution of housing burdens by
prohibiting municipalities and counties from discriminating
against low- and moderate-income and governmentally subsi-
dized housing. As such, the California legislation provides a
thought-provoking model for state or local fair share siting laws
in the environmental equity context.
The California legislation states that each county and city
must adopt a "comprehensive, long-term general plan for the
physical development of the county or city."285 These general
plans must set forth "objectives, principles, standards and plan
proposals" with respect to a variety of mandatory "elements."28 6
One such element is the "housing element."28 7 The housing ele-
ment must identify adequate sites for all forms of housing and
must "make adequate provision for the existing and projected
needs of all economic segments of the community."2 8
Each housing element must include several considera-
tions, 2 9 but the most relevant for the purposes of this Comment
is the consideration requiring an "assessment of housing needs
and an inventory of resources and constraints relevant to the
meeting of those needs."29 ° This consideration, in turn,
requires an examination of the locality's share of the regional
housing need. 291 The locality's share must include the share of
the housing need of persons at all income levels, and the distri-
bution of housing needs must attempt to "reduce the concentra-
284. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65580-65590.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993),
cited in DANIEL R. MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF
LAND DEVELOPMENT 362 (3d ed. 1990). See also Collin, supra note 91, at 544-45. Like
California, the City of New York is considering a charter revision that will ensure the
equitable distribution of desired and undesired public facilities (such as jails, homeless
shelters, and drug treatment centers) among neighborhoods. Id. at 544. Presumably,
this revision would also affect sewage treatment plants and various polluting
industries.
285. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West 1983).
286. Id. § 65302.
287. Id. § 65302(c); MANDELKER & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 284, at 362.
288. CAL. GOVT CODE § 65583 (West 1983) (emphasis added).
289. The other factors include (1) an analysis of"potential and actual governmental
constTaints" on "development of housing for all income levels, including land use
controls"; (2) an analysis of the "availability of financing, the price of land, and the cost
of construction"; and (3) a five-year housing program that must identify "adequate
sites... [for the] development of a variety of types of housing for all income levels."
MANDELKER & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 284, at 363.
290. CAL. GOVT CODE § 65583(a) (West 1983).
291. Id. § 65583(a)(1); see also id. § 65584.
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tion of lower income households in cities or counties which
already have disproportionately high proportions of lower
income households.292 This is the heart of the fair share legisla-
tion. The fair share for each county or city shall be determined
by the appropriate council of governments, defined as single or
multicounty councils,293 based upon statewide housing need
data provided by the California Dept. of Housing and Commu-
nity Development.29 4 The Department has the power to review
and, if necessary, revise the council of government's determina-
tion of the locality's fair share.295
The California legislation offers some useful suggestions for
similar legislation in the environmental equity context. If each
state enacted some form of fair share siting legislation based on
the California housing model, the problem of environmental
inequity could be addressed on the national level in a way that
preserves the benefits of state and local autonomy. The fair
share siting legislation would work in the following manner:
Like the California municipalities and counties, each target
area as designated by the Environmental Justice Act would be
required to adopt a comprehensive plan. Once again, it is
important to note that the Act's definition of target area must
be as small as possible so as to avoid abuse of the system within
each target area (i.e., placing all fair share facilities in a minor-
ity corner of a neighborhood, district, town, or other smaller
subdivision).
Replacing the housing elements in these comprehensive
plans would be "environmental burden elements." Environ-
mental burdens would range from landfills to petrochemical
plants to hazardous waste storage facilities. Like the housing
element, this environmental burden element would include sev-
eral considerations:
(1) an assessment of the need for environmental burdens,
including that target area's share of the regional environmental
burdens;
(2) the potential and actual governmental constraints on the
equalization of environmental burdens for all citizens regard-
less of race or socioeconomic status;
(3) the cost of construction and price of the land; and
292. Id. § 65584(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
293. Id. § 65582(b) (West 1983).
294. Id. § 65584(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
295. Id.
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(4) an environmental equity program, which must identify sites
that are not overly burdened and that will be made available
through appropriate zoning.
The locality's share of the regional environmental burdens
noted in the first factor would have to be provided by an entity
such as the California councils of governments. The wisdom of
the California model is that the council of governments is a
somewhat neutral entity, at least when it is a multicounty coun-
cil. This type of decision-making entity, when coupled with a
review of the decision by the state's housing and community
development department, decreases the NIMBY influence.
Thus, each target area would have to create an entity that
would be responsible for determining its fair share of environ-
mental burdens. As in the California legislation, this must not
be a nonreviewable decision; rather, some larger entity, such as
the Environmental Equity Office,296 must be responsible for
compiling and promulgating nationwide data on environmental
burdens and for reviewing the shares for each target area to
ensure that they are, in fact, consistent with the goal of environ-
mental equity.
As stated previously, legitimate reasons exist for allowing
certain limited exceptions to the requirement that each and
every target area partake equally of the environmental burdens
in our society. For example, our nation does not allow
petrochemical plants or smelters to operate in the Grand Can-
yon, even though this puts an unequal burden on the surround-
ing communities. Thus, the second factor of the environmental
burden element would speak to these kinds of governmental
constraints and narrow exceptions to the fair share siting
mandate.
The first factor is where the heavily impacted minority citi-
zens would find their greatest protection, as they are already
supporting more than their fair share. Moreover, the fourth
factor would be designed to combat the NIMBY syndrome, by
mandating siting in areas that have no or proportionately fewer
environmental burdens and no valid geological or preservation-
ist constraints. It is likely that areas identified according to
296. The Environmental Equity Office was created to deal with environmental
impacts on racial minority and low socioeconomic communities, and it will serve as the
EPA's and public's point of contact for equity issues, technical assistance, and
information dissemination. See Community Leaders Angered by EPA Report on
Pollution Impacts on Poor, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) (July 24, 1992), available in
WESTLAW, BNA File.
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these factors would consist of many of the predominantly white
localities that were previously able to shirk their fair share of
society's environmental burdens.
Thus, fair share siting legislation at the state level would
ameliorate many of the problems associated with current siting
procedures. At the very least, the Environmental Justice Act
should be rewritten to require fair share siting, as well as to
specify the entity in charge of determining the fair share for
each target area and the manner by which this share will be
calculated. The Act should also specify a deadline for comple-
tion of these tasks. Furthermore, as it is probably not possible
to mandate that all states adopt this type of fair share siting
because of federalism constraints, the Act should strongly
encourage states to adopt this approach to siting by stating that
significant amounts of federal funding will be withheld from
states that do not adopt such an approach. Such an approach
would provide a strong incentive for voluntary state implemen-
tation of fair share siting laws to promote environmental equity.
D. Equal Sanctions for Equal Violations
In Part IV.B.5.b, this Comment discussed the fact that pol-
luters in white neighborhoods are likely to pay much higher
fines for pollution violations as compared with the same viola-
tion in minority neighborhoods. This suggests that officials and
agencies responsible for imposing sanctions do not perceive the
environmental quality of minority neighborhoods to be as valu-
able as that of white neighborhoods. To make matters worse, it
often takes much longer for an environmental hazard to be
placed on the Superfund priority action list for cleanup if it is
located in a minority community.297
The Act is entirely silent on this aspect of environmental
inequity. Clearly, the sanctions for violations and the time
frames for cleanups should be uniformly enforced if the Act is to
achieve its purpose of environmental justice. But it is difficult
to suggest a revision to the Act that would remedy the problem
of inequitable enforcement and sanctions. While the Act could
establish a uniform schedule of fines for violations of the major
pollution laws of this country that applied equally to polluters
of white and minority neighborhoods, such a schedule would not
address the widespread failure of agencies and officials to
297. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 15, at S2.
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enforce the rules equitably. Such change may well have to come
from within.2 98 At the very least, however, the Act should
acknowledge that the discrepancy in enforcement and sanctions
exists and that it provides one more example of the need for
environmental justice. It should also strongly encourage, as a
policy statement, the equitable enforcement of all environmen-
tal laws at all levels.
E. Racial Impact Mapping and Racial Impact Statements
Another suggestion for improving the link between the pro-
visions of the Act and equity goals is the inclusion of provisions
requiring use of "racial impact mapping" and "racial impact
statements." These tools would be useful in attaining the Act's
ultimate goal, whether the siting process is left in the hands of
the states or placed in the hands of a federal entity.
Racial impact mapping would require the siting entity to
identify the neighborhoods, census tracts, or communities that
have no environmentally hazardous facilities or plants in a
given target area-a county, city, or town. The siting entity
would then compare these areas with locales that have one or
more facilities or industries, thereby enabling the siting entity
to better assess the possible inequities of its siting plans. This
tool could be incorporated into a fair share siting approach
because the entity in charge of determining the fair share for
each target area would need to perform some type of racial
impact mapping to determine existing unequal burdens. The
results of the mapping would determine future permitting and
siting availability in target areas.
Racial impact statements, on the other hand, would require
a specific description of the racial demographics of the sur-
rounding communities within a certain radius of the proposed
site. They would, therefore, force developers and sitting entities
to consider alternatives to a proposed siting decision and to
acknowledge any disproportionate environmental burdens on
minority communities. The racial impact statement would be
required to indicate specific potential environmental impacts on
surrounding minority and low-income communities. For exam-
298. Recently, Attorney General Janet Reno commented that the Justice
Department will supplement the EPA's required regulatory efforts under President
Clinton's February executive order to provide minority communities with equal
protection from polluters. See Melissa Healy, "Environmental Justice" for U.S.
Minorities Is Ordered, L.A. TMEs, Feb. 12, 1994, at 15A; see supra note 6.
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ple, any particularly high risk to a minority community, such as
the potential contamination of fish (as a result of a proposed
site) in a community that consumes large quantities and has a
fishing-based economy, would have to be clearly noted.2"'
Racial impact statements would be modeled after the envi-
ronmental impact statements mandated by section 102 of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 00 Unlike the
traditional environmental impact statement, however, which is
required for "major federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment,"3 0 ' the racial impact state-
ment would apply to a broader array of environmental burdens.
The Environmental Justice Act would be revised to require a
racial impact statement for each new "toxic chemical facility" as
that term is defined in House Bill 2105.302 Thus, with more
facilities subject to a racial impact consideration, the Act would
move closer to achieving its equity goal.
F. An Environmental Inequity Action
Part III of this Comment noted the poor results achieved by
minority citizens and organizations using the Equal Protection
Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge environmental ineq-
uity. Although slightly more successful, even challenges based
on inadequate environmental impact statements are difficult
for minority groups to win because minorities often lack access
to legal resources. If these challenges fail, the project is likely
to go forward and minority communities have little or no possi-
bility for redress. The Environmental Justice Act should pro-
299. The Puyallup Tribe, near Tacoma, Washington, is just such a subsistence
fishing community. The Tribe's reservation includes a large Superfund site in the
industrial area of the Port of Tacoma. Marcia Coyle, A Way of Life Is Threatened, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S9 (special investigation section). High pollution levels in the
Tribe's fishing waters have severely damaged the Tribe's economy and cultural identity,
and has contributed to increased cancer rates among its members. Id.
300. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1988).
301. VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
117 (Quonum Books ed., 1990).
302. House Bill 2105 § 101 defines "toxic chemical facilities" as
all facilities including federal facilities subject to a permit, inspection, or
review, or registration requirement pursuant to the authority of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act; the Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act; the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act; and the OSHA Hazard
Communication Standard; as well as any facility subject to reporting
obligations pursuant to the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act.
H.R. 2105, supra note 5, § 101.
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vide the means by which disproportionately impacted citizens
can seek redress and mandate enforcement. This can be accom-
plished by providing a cause of action for disproportionate
impact.
In one of the first articles to explore the concept of environ-
mental racism, Rachel Godsil suggested that federal legislation
should create a disparate impact cause of action to address dis-
crimination in connection with hazardous waste facility sit-
ings.3 °3 The cause of action, which would focus on the
"consequences of site selection rather than the motivations," °4
would be modeled after an amendment to Title VII suggested by
the Civil Rights Act of 1990.305 Like the two-pronged analysis
in the 1990 bill, Godsil's cause of action rests on two elements:
disparate impact and environmental necessity.3 0 6
To prove disparate impact, Godsil suggests that plaintiffs
will have to demonstrate that the siting of the facility will result
in a greater burden on their community due to the presence of
other polluted sites or polluting industries, than on a white
community. 0 7 This showing of greater impact is necessary
because some degree of disparate impact occurs any time a haz-
ardous waste facility is sited. 08 Once the plaintiff satisfies this
initial burden, the burden would shift to the defendant to
demonstrate that the hazardous waste facility siting decision is
an environmental necessity. 30 9 Environmental necessity
requires a showing that the site was environmentally suitable
(according to the state's particular criteria) and, if the plaintiff
contends that alternative sites were available, that it was nec-
essary for the safe disposal of the hazardous wastes.310
303. Godsil, supra note 17, at 421-22.
304. Id. at 422.
305. See Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990). Godsil
notes that this Act, which was ultimately vetoed by former President Bush, would have
amended Title VII to eliminate the necessity of proving discriminatory purpose in
employment discrimination cases. See Godsil, supra note 17, at 421, 421 n.207. Under
the Act, an unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact exists where two
elements are satisfied: The plaintiff "demonstrates that an employment practice results
in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin," and the
defendant is unable to "demonstrate that such practice is required by business
necessity." See S. 2104, supra, § 4.
306. Godsil, supra note 17, at 422.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 422-23.
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Thus, including Godsil's proposed cause of action or a simi-
lar cause of action in the Environmental Justice Act would pro-
vide greater protection to minority communities by making
their burden of proof less onerous in challenging final decisions
and by acknowledging the persuasive value of their statistics
and data. The disparate impact cause of action would also pro-
vide a workable compromise between the present need to locate
hazardous facilities and the current disproportionate burden on
minority communities; if the defendant can show that a particu-
lar site is an environmental necessity, the siting decision will go
forward despite the disparate impact.3 11 The Act should, how-
ever, increase the reach of the cause of action to encompass all
toxic chemical facilities as defined in the Act,3 12 as opposed to
merely hazardous waste facilities.
The significance of this cause of action can be seen by
applying it to the facts of El Pueblo.31 3 In that case, attorney
Luke Cole could clearly show that the incinerator would dispro-
portionately impact the Kettleman City residents, particularly
with a hazardous waste landfill already located in the area.
Chemical Waste would have a much more difficult time justify-
ing its decision as an environmental necessity. Arguably, the
residents in the E. Bibb Twiggs3 4 and Bean 31 1 cases would
receive the same benefit. Thus, the need to revise the proposed
Act to include an effective means for redress is compelling.
The Act could also be revised to include an environmental
equity action modeled after a proposed amendment to the Solid
Waste Disposal Act3 16 that is currently under review in the U.S.
House of Representatives .3 " This House bill, entitled the
"Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993," provides a frame-
work whereby
any citizen residing in a State in which a new facility for the
management of solid waste (including a new facility for the
management of hazardous waste) is proposed to be con-
311. Id. at 423.
312. See H.R. 2105, supra note 5, § 101.
313. El Pueblo Para El Aire Y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, No. 366045 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991).
314. Godsil, supra note 171, at 424. Godsil discusses the disparate impact cause of
action in terms of its hypothetical application to the E. Bibb Twiggs case. Because of
the similarity in data available to the plaintiffs, however, it is possible to make a similar
argument with reference to the Bean case.
315. 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
316. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
317. See H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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structed in an environmentally disadvantaged community
may submit a petition to the appropriate entity.., to prevent
the proposed facility from being issued a permit to be con-
structed or to operate in that community.318
The key to the legislation is that the challenge brought by peti-
tioners would be based on "the choice of location being within 2
miles of another waste facility, Superfund site, or facility that
releases toxic contaminants, and. .. being in a community that
has a higher than average percentage of low-income or minority
residents."319
Notably, the Environmental Equal Rights Act and its right
to petition pertain only to the siting of solid waste disposal facil-
ities. However, the Act is important because it recognizes that
it is not necessarily the facility itself that burdens the commu-
nity. Rather, the burden stems from the cumulative environ-
mental and health effects brought about by a concentration of
several such facilities in minority communities. Accordingly,
the Act incorporates ideas of racial impact mapping and fair
share siting, insofar as it is providing a petition right to commu-
nities that already have their share of environmental and
health burdens.
A version of this right to petition concept should be incorpo-
rated into the Environmental Justice Act. The right to petition
should extend to all toxic chemical facilities, as defined in sec-
tion 101 of House Bill 2105. Not only would this addition pro-
vide minority citizens with a valuable legal tool in the initial
stages of siting decisions and give them a greater chance of
being heard, but it would also strengthen the TAG provision in
the Act; minority communities would then have both the tool
and the funds to use that tool.
Ideally, though, the Act should include both an explicit
right to petition, which would operate only prospectively, and a
cause of action, like that suggested by Godsil, that enables the
affected communities to challenge existing facilities. While pro-
spective remedies will ensure that the burdens minority com-
munities bear do not get worse, other remedies are needed to
equalize some of the existing injustice.
318. Id. § 7014(a).
319. See 139 CONG. REC. E1106, E1107 (daily ed. April 30, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Collins). Note that the petitioner would also have to demonstrate that the proposed
facility may have adverse health or environmental quality impacts on the surrounding
community. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to demonstrate two things:
First, the problem of environmental inequity is a pressing con-
cern that requires legislative response. Second, the legislative
response represented by the proposed Environmental Justice
Act of 1993 does not adequately address the concern. The stud-
ies and cases illustrating the disparate environmental and
health impacts on minority communities demonstrate that
there is injustice in the existing siting and permitting proce-
dures and legal tools. The Act, although a commendable effort
to address these facts, will not achieve its stated goal of environ-
mental justice or equity. As it is presently drafted, the Act
lacks a racial nexus, fails to consistently pursue equitable dis-
tribution of environmental and health hazards, fails to take a
hard look at the core problem of siting procedures, and fails to
provide any meaningful tools of redress for affected communi-
ties as they attempt to equalize their environmental burdens in
public hearings and courtrooms. Thus, only with substantial
revisions will the Act achieve any true measure of environmen-
tal justice.
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